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An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

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Bosnia Peace Talks Continue in Geneva

Serbs Criticize Draft Agreement

LD0606172594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1610 GMT 6 Jun 94

[Excerpt] Geneva, 6 Jun (TANJUG)—The republic of Srpska delegation met Yasushi Akashi, UN special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, this afternoon in the Palace of Nations. The delegation informed him about its criticisms and suggestions regarding a draft document on a general cease-fire in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to its general commitment to a lasting cessation of hostilities, the Serbian delegation also voiced some technical criticism regarding the issue of the corridor [linking Serbia with occupied areas in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina], TANJUG learned from sources within the Serbian delegation. [passage omitted]

Buha Anticipates Further Talks

LD0706085694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0826 GMT 7 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, June 7 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha said on Tuesday morning [7 May] that an agreement on a cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina might be signed at another meeting, probably at Sarajevo airport, rather than at the current talks in Geneva. This is a prediction based on the rather modest results produced by bilateral contacts held on Monday by U.N. envoy to former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi with Bosnia's warring Moslems, Serbs and Croats, Buha told TANJUG. He stressed that, in its latest proposal submitted to Akashi, the Bosnian Serb delegation had offered a cessation of hostilities for a year, whereas the Moslem-Croat delegation had asked for a ceasefire of between four and six weeks, but not longer.

With the widely differing positions the delegations are embarking on the second day of the Geneva conference and what they hoped late on Monday would be a meeting in plenum. Akashi told reporters on Monday evening that a ceasefire agreement might be signed on Tuesday, with luck.

Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic said on Monday that the Serb delegation was in favour of a permanent cessation of hostilities and was willing to endorse Akashi's plan for a four-month ceasefire with slight modifications. Akashi's spokesman Michael Williams said he expected the Geneva talks to end on Tuesday, but indicated they might continue if agreement were not reached.

Krajisnik Less Optimistic Than Akashi

LD0706114094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1007 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Obrenovac, 7 Jun (TANJUG)—Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the Srpska republic assembly, told Radio Obrenovac that "despite Mr. Akashi's great hopes and expectations that the agreement will be signed today," the Serb side is "nowhere nearly that optimistic." "This means that we will not be surprised if the agreement is not signed. The reasons are obvious—the Croat-Muslim side has been using all means to obstruct the agreement," Krajisnik said.

"The Muslim demands are not insurmountable as far as we are concerned and this fact deprives them of their last trump card," Krajisnik said, adding that this "automatically brings into question any further support by those who suggested obstruction to them."

Asked about the reasons for his doubts about the successful outcome of the negotiations, Krajisnik recalled that similar indications of an early accord were seen before and that everyone knew how they ended up.

"The fact that the Muslim delegation does not include the military commander who should sign the agreement shows that this situation today resembles earlier unsuccessful attempts," Krajisnik said, adding that in view of this and other details the Serb side came to the conclusion that "they have no intention of signing."

"However, they came to Geneva for fear of condemnation by the international public. Even if they sign the agreement I doubt that they will respect if implemented. To put it simply, it seems that at this moment they believe that they can use the military option to achieve more favorable solution; but this only means a continuation of the war," Krajisnik told Radio Obrenovac.

Ganic 'Insists' on 1-Month Cease-Fire

LD0706120494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1123 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Excerpts] Geneva, 7 Jun (TANJUG)—Bilateral consultations between Yasushi Akashi, UN special envoy for former Yugoslavia, and the heads of the warring Bosnian sides' delegations resumed in Geneva today. [passage omitted]

At about noon Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Muslim-Croat Federation, told reporters at the Palais des Nations that his delegation "insists on a one-month cease-fire." This means he does not accept the proposal for a four-month cessation of hostilities outlined by the contact group in its declaration issued on 13 May.

The delegation of the Srpska republic, headed by President Radovan Karadzic, met with Yasushi Akashi in the Palais des Nations. There have been no reports about the details of their consultations.

Karadzic, Krajisnik Comment on Talks

LD0706125194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1209 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Geneva, 7 Jun (TANJUG)—Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic says that there is a possibility of a document marking the end of the war being signed this afternoon in Geneva's Palais des Nations. Following his talks with Yasushi Akashi, UN special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, Karadzic said at a news conference: "We have conducted difficult but constructive talks. Our suggestion about a general 12-month cease-fire was not accepted."

Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Srpska republic assembly, said to a TANJUG correspondent:

"We expect that a document will be signed on an all-encompassing four-month cease-fire, but we still have to wait for the Muslim side's reply. Yasushi Akashi is expected to meet the Muslim delegation this afternoon. Afterwards, a plenary session may take place and, eventually, documents may be signed. Everything is still uncertain, though."

Ganic on Talks With Butrus-Ghali

AU0706153294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Statement by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Geneva; date not given—recorded]

[Text] The talks with Butrus Butrus-Ghali were very interesting because Europe is celebrating D-Day, the day when it united itself against fascism and against Hitler. Unfortunately, we here in Geneva are holding talks with those who have started fascism, and I think the United Nations should draw a parallel between these two days, today and the day that is being celebrated in Europe—this is very euphoric—the day when all forces united against Hitler. However, they have allowed the Belgrade fascism to promote its ideas here in the heart of Europe.

Butrus-Ghali said that the United Nations has had many problems recently. Problems are appearing everywhere. Of course, we have stressed that this is, above all, the responsibility of the United Nations, which did not act preventively and did not stop the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Bosnia. They have verified and bred the virus of ethnic cleansing that is now spreading throughout the world. I think the situation is very alarming and that the United Nations must demonstrate consistency in Bosnia; it must stop fascism to somehow regain its credibility and do something in other parts of the world.

The talks are continuing. Of course, the aggressor is using the tactics of freezing. It wants the United Nations to protect the territories that it has captured as well as its trenches on the front lines; its soldiers are tired and are demanding to be replaced. However, we will not agree to that. The negotiations are still going on.

Simic Comments on Talks With Akashi

AU0706205294 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Federal Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic held talks with Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy, in Geneva today. Here is how Deputy Prime Minister Simic commented on these talks in a statement for Radio-Television Serbia.

[Begin Simic recording] Mr. Yasushi Akashi is resolved to persevere in his post of completely objective and unbiased mediator—or better yet, negotiator who is not inclined to give in to pressure and ultimatums of any one factor on the international political scene, including those who consider themselves to be absolute arbiters and interpreters of new regulations in international relations.

In these talks, he quite directly stressed that he was against employing force to solve any type of conflict and that he would remain a consistent advocate of all diplomatic and political means at his disposal for calming the malignant tensions in the civil and religious war in the former Yugoslav republic. In this respect, he also spoke about the topical problems between Knin and Zagreb and stressed quite openly that the war option would not only be hasty and precipitant, but that it would also be absolutely unacceptable for the international community. According to him, all the known problems should be solved in three phases: first, the establishment of a lasting and unconditional cease-fire; second, the revival of indispensable communication that would pave the way for finding a just, pragmatic political agreement acceptable to both sides. [as heard]

When we acquainted him with the continued efforts that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been undertaking for restraining the winds of war that, due to the open and very dangerous aid extended to the Muslim extremists, are threatening to escalate into a conflict of greater proportion with unforeseeable consequences, Akashi retorted that, without Yugoslavia's active mediating role, neither the war in the former Yugoslavia nor the crisis on the entire Balkan peninsula could be solved. What is more, he added that the agreement that was signed in Belgrade at the initiative and under the patronage of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was decisive for the continuation of negotiations on the cease-fire and for the revival of the entire negotiating process.

We remarked that it was difficult to expect more from a country that is not involved in the civil war and that is, above all, defending its survival while burdened with the repressive sanctions. Akashi answered that he agreed with our assessment but that the international community's approach to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a lot more balanced and objective precisely because

of the policy of peace that it is conducting and that is absolutely transparent to all the participants, so he said.

Since the talks were joined by the chief of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] civilian sector, (De Mallo), also discussed were the Yugoslav delegation's serious remarks regarding the behavior of certain members—or better said, certain parts of UNPROFOR—and evident violations of the principles of objectivity and unbiased approach, which, in our opinion, could be extremely dangerous to the international community's fate and to its role in international relations.

It is understandable that the talks with the economic working group, headed by academician Kosta Mihajlovic, were overshadowed by the negotiating events that I have just discussed. According to the chairmen, the Yugoslav Government has taken a series of positive measures toward reviving the market economy. [end recording]

Akashi Starts New Round of Talks

LD0706214394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1947 GMT 7 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, June 7 (TANJUG)—Special U.N. envoy for former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi on Tuesday evening started a new round of bilateral talks with Bosnia's warring parties after which he would decide whether or not to continue the Geneva conference on the cessation of hostilities in that war-torn former Yugoslav republic.

Visibly exhausted by futile attempts over the past five days to establish communication between the belligerents and create conditions for talks, Akashi said on Tuesday afternoon the conference might be continued in Sarajevo and in Pale.

The international mediator is currently meeting for the third time in a single day with vice-president of the Moslem-Croat Federation Ejup Gapic to persuade him to accept a platform on a four-month general ceasefire proposed by the contact group on Bosnia.

The Bosnian Serb delegation has indicated it may accept the platform, and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has stated that an agreement to that effect may be reached by the evening.

The start of the talks was delayed for four days because the Moslems claimed all armed Serbs had not left the three-kilometre exclusion zone around Gorazde in eastern Bosnia as set out in U.N. Security Council Resolution 913.

The Moslems on Monday attempted to seize the territory around Gorazde from which the Serbs had withdrawn, a U.N. spokesman in Sarajevo said on Tuesday.

The plenary session of the Bosnia peace talks has had to be postponed for three times because the Moslem-Croat delegation remains firm in its position that a ceasefire can be signed for a maximum of four to six weeks.

Karadzic: Muslims Want War, Not Peace

LD0706215694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2040 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Excerpt] Geneva, 7 Jun (TANJUG)—Late this evening Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic said after yet another round of talks with special envoy Yasushi Akashi that the Muslim side wanted war and not peace. "It is also obvious that someone is supporting them from the outside," he pointed out.

Before leaving the UN headquarters, Karadzic said that the Serb delegation would remain in Geneva until tomorrow to see if the Muslim-Croat delegation would soften its stand according to which it would accept only a four-week cease-fire. [passage omitted]

Talks 'Undermined' by Muslim-Croat Side

LD0806022494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2123 GMT 7 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, June 7 (TANJUG)—Ejup Ganic, vice-president of the Bosnian Moslem-Croat Federation, retained his inflexible position after a third round of talks with special U.N. Envoy Yasushi Akashi in Geneva on Tuesday evening that the Federation could only accept a four-week-long ceasefire for war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina. Proceeding from a declaration adopted by the contact group on Bosnia on May 13 in Geneva, Akashi has been insisting on a four-month truce.

In Ganic's view, everything else but a four-week ceasefire would imply retaining the status quo from which only the Serbs would benefit. He also reprimanded reporters at the Palais des Nations for ignoring his accusations of the Serbs.

"I have seen all the papers and my statements are nowhere to be found.

"Today I told (U.N. Secretary-General Butrus) Butrus-Ghali he is chiefly to blame for the spreading of the ethnic cleansing policy in the world," said Ganic aggressively.

Regardless of his fervent anti-Serb campaign, Ganic is no longer able to hide from the reporters the simple truth that the conference is being undermined by the Moslem-Croat side.

Early in the afternoon, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said the Serbs were prepared to accept Akashi's suggestion for a four-month ceasefire and that some results conducive to peace would be achieved in Geneva after all. More bilateral talks will be held in the evening.

Akashi: Serbs Accept 4-Month Cease-Fire

LD0706223094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2128 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Geneva, June 7 (TANJUG)—Special United Nations (U.N.) envoy for former Yugoslavia [words indistinct] said at the U.N. headquarters in Geneva late on Tuesday evening that the talks on a ceasefire in Bosnia-Herzegovina would continue tomorrow, despite great difficulties. Akashi also announced meetings with the Moslem-Croat delegation and with Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic on Wednesday. This means that a plenary session will again not be held on Wednesday, in all probability.

Akashi confirmed to reporters that Bosnian Serbs had accepted a four-month ceasefire as proposed in a declaration adopted by the contact group for Bosnia-Herzegovina in Geneva on May 13. The latest Moslem proposal for a ceasefire is four weeks plus four weeks, Akashi said, but did not elaborate on the stand of the U.N., which is the mediator in the peace talks, regarding these proposals.

Authorities Close Road Link With Montenegro

AU0706132894 Paris AFP in English 1300 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Podgorica, Yugoslavia, June 7 (AFP)—The only road link between Albania and Montenegro has been closed to traffic for five days, a local daily reported Tuesday. The Albanian authorities have forbidden any vehicles from crossing into or out of Montenegro—which together with Serbia forms rump-Yugoslavia—at Bozaj, said Lazar Jankovic, spokesman for the Yugoslav Commission for Border Incidents, quoted Tuesday by the local daily POBJEDA. The road is open to pedestrians.

The Albanian authorties apparently took the action after Albanian truck drivers had blocked the border because, Jankovic said, they were "unhappy at the changing criteria imposed by Yugoslav customs officials." Since a total embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia two years ago, the Bozaj border-control post has become the focus of traffic in oil and other supplies for the Yugoslav market. Several Montenegrins were arrested recently by Albanians for trafficking oil, according to rumours which Montengrin authorities refuse to confirm.

PJOBEDA said it had learnt from unoffical sources that six policemen and a Montenegrin customs officer were being questioned for their role in the trafficking.

Zhulali Previews Official Visit to U.S.

AU0706211094 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Report on an interview with Defense Minister Safet Zhulali by Amalia Dhamo in Tirana on 7 June—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] A high-level military delegation led by Defense Minister Safet Zhulali left for the United States today. The delegation will visit the National Guard in South Carolina and will hold special meetings with high-level officials at the Pentagon and U.S. State Department, including U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry. Our correspondent interviewed Mr. Zhulali before his departure:

[Dhamo] Mr. Minister, at the invitation of the National Guard of South Carolina you are leading a high-level military delegation on an official visit to the United States. What do you hope to achieve during this visit?

[Zhulali] The goal of this visit is to further strengthen the extremely good relations that exist between Albania and the United Sates in the field of defense. There is an infrastructure of political and economic relations between Albania and the United States, and we can now add relations in the field of defense, which were implemented with the signing of a memorandum and other developments between our two armies.

In return for the visit paid by the delegation of the National Guard of South Carolina and upon their invitation, we are visiting the United States to aquaint ourselves with their experiences in organization, drills—mainly with reservists—the training of noncommissioned officers, and the possibility to profit from them in all the activities they organize, which are of a wide variety. We also want to learn about the fields of organization and legislation.

My visit to the United States could be divided into two parts: The first part is in South Carolina and the second part, which constitutes, shall we say, the political part of the program, includes very important meetings at the Pentagon with political and military officials, including Defense Secretary William Perry, and meetings at the State Department with congressional representatives, senators, and various politicians.

I plan to inform them about the successful development of reform in Albania, the further consolidation of democracy, the close relations between Albania and the United States, the further support that Albania asks from the United States to consolidate democracy, and the progress of the reform. We will request the same from our military colleagues, who, seeing the good progress of the reform in the Army, have supported it. However, we think they should give more support for the Albanian Army, which, just like all our state structures, plays an important role in the peace and stability in the region.

Socialist Leader on U.S. Role, Greek Relations

NC0806102094 Athens ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 3 Jun 94 p 7

[Report from Tirana by Takis Dhiamandis]

[Text] Nothing has been happening with the Greek minority situation in the last few days, according to Americans who visited Gjirokaster to check on the charges made against a large number of witnesses last week. "The numbers mentioned are totally unverified," a U.S. Embassy spokesman said, and added:

"There is talk about 40, 60, or 70 people, but I only know about 25." The same spokesman said that what actually happened was that the witnesses were summoned normally and according to the law, except for a few cases where certain persons were summoned by the police.

These remarks give rise to reasonable questions even among the Albanian opposition, whose leading members claim openly that the shadow of some U.S. secret agencies hovers behind the Albanian Government's actions.

Commenting on [Albanian President] Sali Berisha's policy, Servet Pellumbi, first vice chairman of the Socialist Party of Albania, sarcastically said yesterday that "one can find many good things about Berisha, but ideas are not among them." He added:

"No matter how crazy Berisha might be, he cannot possibly act alone." As he explained, it is impossible for the policy of Berisha and the Albanian Government not to be guided by other foreign powers and primarily the United States. However, he stressed: "We should know, however, that the U.S. policy toward Albania is not unified. There is congressional policy, State Department policy, and the secret agencies' policy."

Pellumbi added that things in the political field recently seem to be changing as the U.S. Embassy is slowly approaching the other political parties, even the Socialist Party.

Leading members of other Albanian parties agree with this assessment by Servet Pellumbi and they also maintain that this means a change in the stance of Americans toward Albania. However, this view is not shared by a foreign diplomat in Tirana, who said that the Americans' opening up to all the Albanian parties shows precisely their determination to be regulators of domestic affairs in Albania—and in a broader sense of its foreign relations—for a long time.

According to a statement to a Greek correspondent by Servet Pellumbi, the Socialist Party of Albania insists on the path of dialogue with Greece and not the escalation of tension. Pellumbi made it clear that this position forms the basis of criticism that the Socialist Party of Albania makes against the government and President Seli Berisha on the issue of Greek-Albanian relations.

At the same time, Pellumbi expressed satisfaction at the cool and reasonable stance maintained by the Greek Government during the recent crisis in the two countries' relations and stressed in particular the fact that the Greek side did not play its card of Albanian immigrants as the Konstandinos Mitsotakis government had done in the past. He added that the latter fact had a favorable effect on the Albanian people and it is something which, as he noted, Berisha himself did not understand.

On the subject of the Albanian president, Pellumbi said that he has no cohesion in his policy whatsoever and that he seems to like Europe but his mind is really elsewhere.

However, referring to Greece, the socialist leader said that there are some chauvinistic circles from which he believes the Greek Government should be cut off and moreover that Greece should respect the autocephalous status of the Albanian Orthodox Church and not link it to the Albanian state from which it was already separated as of 1928.

Pellumbi also condemned the ugly incidents during Easter and stressed that "unfortunately, the two countries' governments became involved in them afterward."

In conclusion, Pellumbi stressed that until now the U.S. Embassy in Tirana has supported the Albanian Government's policy. Concerning Europe, he said that "for Berisha it constitutes the font in which he will be pardoned for all the violations of political and human rights in the name of the internal and external 'dangers' facing Albania and which nevertheless are the result of the lack of capability of Berisha himself and his government."

Further on Pellumbi Comments

NC0806102294 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Jun 94 p 4

[Report by Tirana special correspondent Marina Vikhou]

[Excerpt] In an interview with Greek correspondents, Servet Pellumbi, first vice chairman of the Socialist Party of Albania, said that "the U.S. policy in the case of Albania is not unified. The State Department follows a different policy from that of the CIA and the Pentagon."

Explaining his position, Pellumbi said that "the U.S. State Department initially favored the fall of the communist system as well as the technical support and democratization of Albania. At the same time, there are U.S. military interests in the Balkans and Europe that are separate and are expressed by the Pentagon."

Pellumbi also pointed out that "Albania is being strengthened by the United States more militarily than economically. However, this causes concern to the other Balkan states. The Socialist Party has supported from the very beginning that since we participate in the 'Partnership for Peace' we should tell the people the whole truth."

According to the Socialist Party vice chairman, "no permission can be given to U.S. spy planes to use Albania as a base for their flights over the former Yugoslavia unless the Albanian people are informed in advance, unless some referendum is held to tell them the pros and cons of such a decision."

However, Pellumbi expressed his optimism that "recently the State Department's stand has been more positive, their statements are more objective. They give us to understand that they will defend the forces that are based on the people. The U.S. Embassy in Tirana has until now been unreservedly supporting the policy of [Albanian President Sali] Berisha. However, I think that with the arrival of the new ambassador in Tirana in September, the situations will improve."

Pellumbi's position on the relations between the Berisha regime and Europe was interesting. He noted that "the biggest problem facing the Albanian Government is its relations with Europe.

"Europe calls the Tirana government the 'Berisha regime.' With the escalation of tension he applies to Greek-Albanian relations, Berisha wants to tell Europe 'look, here are our country's stability and security in danger and you are dealing with human rights and democracy.'" [passage omitted]

Nation To Support U.S. on DPRK Sanctions

LD0806090294 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0500 GMT 8 Jun 94

[Excerpts] The UN Security Council is currently considering introducing sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. [passage omitted]

In connection with the Czech Republic's membership in the UN Security Council, Czech radio has asked Ambassador Karel Kovanda, our country's permanent representative to the executive body of the international community, what the Czech position is on the adoption of the sanctions.

[Begin Kovanda recording] The possibility of introducing sanctions against North Korea is a very complicated matter. On the one hand, the issue is that some countries do not at all regard sanctions as a good instrument of international politics. North Korea itself has said on several occasions that it would respond to possible sanctions as a declaration of war. One of the countries that never believes in sanctions and never accedes to them is China, which almost always abstains from each resolution regarding sanctions. So far, China has been very much against any indications of sanctions on the part of the UN Security Council.

The next development will depend on the behind-the-scene discussions between the Big Five, the five permanenent members. The main role will be played here by the United States and China. The side role, outside the UN Security Council, is being played by Japan and South Korea. I dare say that, in this matter, the Czech Republic will very unanimously support any measures to which the U.S. mission to the UN Security Council decides to resort. [end recording]

Klaus Views D-Day, New Parliamentary Procedures

LD0806030794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1615 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent Lucie Weissova in Prague on 7 June—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Weissova] Mr. Prime Minister, in the past few days we were able to follow the impressive celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Allies' landing in Normandy. The celebrations were, however, not without blemishes. The greatest and most criticized fault was probably the failure to invite representatives of Russia. Is the importance of opening the second front overrated, at the expense of the role the USSR played in the war?

[Klaus] Look, I do not want to comment on absolutely everything because, if I do, I am most often criticized from all sides. I am, therefore, speaking with some embarrassment. Nevertheless, I have been living for decades in a world where I thought—I am overstating this slightly—that it was only the Red Army that fought in World War II and that the war in the West was only a shadow war that was utterly irrelevant with regard to the final result of the war. Naturally, I knew that this was nonsense. If, however, the impression is now being made that the exact opposite was true, then I am, in principle, against this sort of interpretation of history that swings from one extreme to the other. It really seems to me to be substantially false. [passage omitted]

[Weissova] On 6 June, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] executive, among other things, dealt with the proposal for new parliamentary procedures. The ODS cabinet members have been authorized to try to ensure that there is no change in the relations between the government and parliament. According to you, some proposals for the new parliamentary procedure seem to go in this direction. Can you specify what they are?

[Klaus] [passage omitted] What I am really concerned about is the fact that a specific interruption has occurred in the interaction between the government and parliament. We have grown accustomed to certain methods of interaction. They became a habit. We have—all of us—mastered these methods to some extent. It seems somewhat useless to pull them down.

The interaction between the government and parliament is a process triggered by the government putting forward an idea and embodying it in a so-called proposal of principles for a particular law. This is not a fully worked out document. Really, it contains only rough ideas, concepts by which we tell ourselves and the parliament that this is probably the way and these are the basic outlines of the law. Parliament, parliamentary committees, discuss this material. The government then is given back the document, and the bill is then drafted on this basis. After this stage, the document will be submitted to parliament again.

It seems to me that this ping-pong, this interaction, is successful. Moreover, we have grown accustomed to it, and I think that it is working error free.

The stage of debating main ideas of a bill is now disappearing from the new procedures, and the government is being asked to submit a bill directly. This means that the dispute, the debate, the mutual enrichment while working on the bill will be missing. I consider this to be a specific weakening of the mutual relations between the government and parliament. [passage omitted]

Klaus Defends Continuity of Czech-German Talks

LD0706115594 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Excerpts] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus today met Karl Lamers, foreign policy spokesman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union [CDU-CSU] Bundestag group. The main topic of their conversation was the situation in Europe and bilateral relations. This

is what the prime minister told journalists after the talks, when commenting on these relations:

[Begin Klaus recording] Indeed, I do not understand the calls for a dialogue with a capital D, because I think that the Czech-German dialogue has been continuing on a daily basis and that it is being carried out every day. [sentence as heard] In the course of this dialogue, we explain specific matters to each other. I reject the claim that there is any kind of discontinuity. I reject the idea that up until now we have not talked to each other and that a D-Day will come when we will draw a new line and say: Czech-German dialogue is starting as of this moment. That is a fiction being created by individuals on both sides, regrettably, and I think that this kind of discontinuity does not exist. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Announcer] Milan Uhde and Jan Kasal, chairman and deputy chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, met the CDU-CSU Bundestag foreign policy spokesman, Karl Lamers, in Prague today, too. They explained to the guest why it was impossible to fulfill the demand that the Benes Decrees [expelling Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia after World War II and confiscating their property] be abolished. They explained that raising and repeating this demand had a negative effect on Czech-German relations.

Problems With German Place-Names Minimized

AU0706082494 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 31 May 94 p 3

[Article by ("kp"): "The Problem of German Names of Communities in the Czech Republic Supposedly Does Not Exist"]

[Text] Prague—The draft treaty on easing border customs clearing in railway, road, and river transportation between the Czech Republic and Germany does not contain names of villages and cities, and, therefore, there is no problem with their German translation. RUDE PRAVO learned this from well-informed circles participating in the drafting of interstate treaties with the Federal Republic of Germany.

According to the RUDE PRAVO source, the planned treaty on state borders between the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany contains no names of villages or cities, either. However, it has transpired from the negotiations presently under way that the problems linked to names in other planned treaties have a good chance of being resolved. For instance, in the Czech version of the treaty on limited border traffic or the intergovernmental agreement on establishing tourist routes on the state borders, only Czech names for Czech communities are to be used. This also applies to the German version, but the German equivalent would be given in brackets—for example, Cheb (Eger). According to the RUDE PRAVO source, this might be acceptable to the Czech side. Originally, the Germans pushed for a solution according to which the Czech villages would be given German names established under the influence of the German historical settlement in Czech border regions. They wanted the Czech names of the villages to be given only in brackets. The Czech side has rejected this demand.

Interior Ministry Reduces Secret Activities

AU0706153794 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 3 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by Premek Houzvicka: "The Number of Classified Facts on the Activity of the Interior Ministry Has Declined Since 1991"]

[Text] The amount of classified data on the activity of the Interior Ministry, to which the law on official and state secrets applies and which cannot therefore be published, has not increased over the past few years. On the contrary, their number has declined since 1991. For instance, information regarding the work and location of individual departments of the ministry is still being kept secret for the time being.

This is what Jan Subert, Interior Ministry press spokesman, said at a news conference yesterday. But, he added, the situation in the Interior Ministry's car pool (amounting to 11,599 official cars and 7,729 passenger cars at present), general information on the arsenal of Interior Ministry members, and the management of financial funds from the state budget are neither secret nor top secret information.

"A complex report on the ministry's conduct of economic affairs, containing roughly 600 pages of text, has been presented to deputies," Deputy Interior Minister Jaroslav Kopriva said. "Of all this material, only about 2 percent can be considered secret information," he added. He also said that, according to him, the Interior Ministry's economic management is not unintelligible, but it contains a lot of individual items.

According to Jan Frolik, archive worker at the Interior Ministry, the state secrets act applies only to information, the classification of which is in the interest of the state. [The obligation not to divulge] official secrets can also be applied to some parts of the public administration, such as the police, counterintelligence, the courts, or the state attorney office. The Interior Ministry will also consider publishing a so-called white book, which should contain all information about the activity of the Interior Ministry that has not been declared secret. "The coordination of the work between the ministry and journalists could also improve that way," Frolik added. According to Frolik, publishing a white book has proved to be very useful in some Western countries. On the subject of lifting the vow of secrecy regarding various aspects of the Interior Ministry's work, Frolik said that it could be lifted during court proceedings, for example, but that does not mean that the person's obligation not to divulge secrets would be lifted in general. "This person's vow of secrecy was lifted only to the benefit of specific bodies," Frolik added.

Press Spokesman J. Subert refused to comment on the question of whether Czech intelligence members are active abroad at present.

Dukovany Permitted To Store Spent Nuclear Fuel

LD0706125694 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] The Ministry for Economy has confirmed granting permission to build a storage depot for spent nuclear fuel at the Dukovany nuclear power station. According to the power station's press spokesman, Petr Spilka, today, no appeal against this decision is possible. Thus, following three years of administrative procedures, the Dukovany power station will be able to start building. Preparatory works on the construction will start as early as this week. The storage depot will house 60 containers containing 600 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel, which should be transferred to the projected central in-process store [centralni mezisklad] by the year 2005.

Military Denies Developing Bacteriological Arms

LD0706124794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] A news conference held in Usti nad Orlici today was dedicated to the alleged production of virological and bacteriological weapons in Techonin, East Bohemian region. Our correspondent Zdena Cela filed this telephone dispatch:

[Cela] The military Immunology and Bacteriology Research Institute in Techonin in Usti nad Orlici district has never produced, developed, or stored military bacteriological weapons. This is what Dr. Jiri Beran, dean of the Hradec Kralove-based Military Medical Academy, who is in charge of scientific work, told the news conference today. Development of a combat biological agent is, above all, a matter for top scientists in the sphere of gene handling and genetic engineering, Beran went on to say. The point is that all of the agents have been identified [zmapovat], and, if one wants to develop a new agent, a new part of a genetic information [carrier] would have to be inserted [in the already identified agents]. No work has ever been done on this subject at the Military Medical Academy.

Dr. Beran explained the attacks waged by CESKY DENIK in March of this year by saying that editors have little knowledge of the subject and are unwilling to look deeper into the problem.

The matter is being investigated by the Defense Ministry inspection team and an interministerial commission.

Klaus Discusses Economic, Banking Matters

AU0806090394 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 3 Jun 94 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci; place and date not given: "The Decline in the Balance of Trade Is a Peripheral Occurrence"]

[Text] [Krejci] Following the government session, you said that the majority of economic indicators are favorable. However, according to the Czech Statistical Office's figures, the balance of trade—that means the difference between exports and imports—is worsening. This means that the export and import curves are more and more divergent. In your view, what has caused this occurrence?

[Klaus] This is merely a partial occurrence. Last year, we had an absolutely enormous and unexpected increase in exports, which far outstripped the increase in comparable countries and the increase in exports in Europe, where stagnation continued. Compared with the large increase in 1993, the figures for 1994 are positive, it is true, but, in view of their immense starting point, they are far lower than last year. Moreover, the balance of payments and other elements of our financial, commercial, and other exchanges abroad—and not only as far as goods are concerned—are a more important indicator than the balance of trade. You know very well that tourism plays a major role. There are countries in which it is so strong—Austria, for example—that their imports are always greater than their exports. This difference is covered in the long term by income from tourism. So, in my opinion, it is wrong to infer any more far-reaching conclusions.

[Krejci] In this context, views are being expressed that the government's approach toward supporting exports should be changed.

[Klaus] We have discussed this in the government many times, and it is not the majority view. This involves a quest by the exporters, who are lobbying and going around all of our institutions to obtain certain further advantages for exports. I do not know of any export company, however, for which the state could in some fundamental way conjure up a place in the sun so that, on this basis, it can gain a foothold on world markets. It is primarily the company itself that must do this, and the role of the state in all of these matters really is just a peripheral and supplementary one. This is the fantasy of enterprises that in the past were used to something else.

[Krejci] The government has discussed an amendment to the banking law. You have said, in this context, that the matter of insuring bank deposits is a secondary issue that should be resolved only in the future. Why?

[Klaus] I did not say "a secondary issue." The draft amendment had two elements. The first concerns the extent to which the central bank may intervene directly in the independent, private commercial banks. The second concerns whether and how to start insuring deposits. In this connection, I said that we consider the issue of the banks' possible supervision and regulation to come first and that of insurance to come only second.

We really see no reason to stitch together a law with a hot needle because we had a problem with a few small banks. Insuring deposits is a problematic issue, because, in principle, it is up to the individual to decide where to

deposit his money. This forms part of the decision-making of each of us, and the simple and guaranteed insurance of deposits would mean wiping out an individual's responsibility for where he has deposited his money.

Second, this would mean a massive reduction in the responsibility of bankers as such. For them, not only the fact that they lose some of their capital is a punishment. The fact that they cause difficulties for thousands of depositors is also a punishment. Such bankers are consequently written off for good, and they have not the slightest chance of ever again being able to operate in this branch. It is necessary to put extra pressure on bankers. That is, they behave far more circumspectly if they do not have the certitude of the generous insurance of deposits and have to strive at all costs themselves to bolster the finances entrusted to them. On the other hand, there is an undertaking to protect the citizen-saver. And, somewhere on the borderline between these two interests, it is necessary to find a perfectly balanced form of insuring deposits.

[Krejci] As far as supervising the Czech National Bank is concerned, the point was that the ownership rights of private people could have been infringed. What kind of guidelines should there be here? Where should supervision extend, and where should it not extend?

[Klaus] We do not want to infringe the rights of private entities. Therefore, we are a little reluctant about giving any extraordinary powers to the central bank. However, making money is something completely different from making watches or ties. When the tie manufacturer fails, nothing happens. When the money-maker fails, this has serious consequences for the whole of society. In this case, it is very difficult to find the right borderline. The fact that we have not approved the amendment to the banking law does not mean that we do not want to get tough and deal with this issue.

[Krejci] The Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] has called upon the other governing parties to discuss the situation within the coalition, with the proviso that this would involve a kind of assessment after two years of coalition government. How do you or the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] view this proposal?

[Klaus] If I want to conduct an assessment, I have to begin with myself. The KDU-CSL would do well to think about how much it contributes to the coalition squabbles or how much someone else contributes to it, inasmuch as whatever unsettles the public and the coalition are the issues that this party drags out. I would begin here, and I would not ask for a sweeping assessment. The ODS decided at its political board meeting that of course it accepts this activity by its coalition partner and that it will attend such meetings. Nevertheless, it itself will not prepare any written material on this subject in advance. We do not feel the need for such an assessment, and, moreover, we feel that improving relations within the coalition does not depend on whether we put something down on paper. That is to say, I do not know how such a paper can erect a dam against the various utterings of the gentlemen deputies from the Civic Democratic Alliance, the KDU-CSL, or the Christian Democratic Party.

President Kovac on D-Day Meetings With Leaders

LD0706225494 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Excerpts] Slovak President Michal Kovac returned home this evening from Great Britain and France, where he took part in the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Allied landings in Normandy.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, the purpose of your visit was, above all, to honor the memory of those who fell during the historical event of the Normandy invasion. However, how do you assess the importance of this visit and your meetings with many important politicians from the foreign policy angle?

[Kovac] It was an opportunity to establish personal contact with a whole range of state representatives, mainly with those I had not met until now. [passage omitted] Of course, it was also an opportunity to deepen still further those contacts that already exist. I have in mind the meeting with President Bill Clinton. I had the opportunity to listen to their interest in Slovakia. They wanted to know what is happening in Slovakia. They expressed an understanding of our policy. They were interested to see the continuation of the Slovak transformation, of building friendly relations with neighboring states, and they want Slovakia to contribute toward the stability of the Central European region. [end recording]

EU Proposal on Dam 'Political,' Unacceptable

LD0706135194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan by correspondent Zuzana Stukovska; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Stukovska] To attain a political compromise, European Union [EU] experts have recommended to Slovakia an increase in the average inflow into the old Danube River bed at the Gabcikovo Dam to 800 cubic meters a second. Is this proposal acceptable to the Slovak Government?

[Kukan] The EU commission's recommendation to increase the inflow in the old Danube River bed to 800 cubic meters a second is a proposal for a political solution that is not acceptable to the Slovak Government. We think there are a sufficient number of other technical measures to attain the aim put forward by Hungary; we are also interested in achieving an agreement on this. We are presenting these technical proposals and would like to discuss them.

We would like to explain to the EU that our approach to this issue is serious. However, its expert group's recommendation—it gave us a number of proposals and all were acceptable to us except this one, which seems to us to be a political solution—we reject, and we reject any political pressure to have it accepted.

[Stukovska] Obviously there will be talks with Hungary. At which level should they be conducted?

[Kukan] We are interested in continuing the talks on temporary water management with Hungary. You, however, know the current situation in Hungary: A new government is being constituted, a new parliament has been elected. We have certain positive signs that the Hungarian position might be changing. I am a realist and will wait and see what happens. We are having continuous diplomatic correspondence with the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. To answer your question, These talks will be technical talks between experts dealing with the issues linked to temporary water management.

[Stukovska] Can you tell us, at least approximately, when they might be held?

[Kukan] It depends on when a new government is formed in Hungary.

Report on Russian Mafia Control Rejected

AU0706153994 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by "jo, jc": "Are We Under the Control of the Russian Mafia?"]

[Text] Bratislava—The day before yesterday, we published a report on the deliberations of a U.S. Senate subcommission that dealt with the expansion of Russian organized crime on the territory of the United States and the whole of Europe. As reported by the U.S. press, at the meeting, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Director Louis Freeh expressed, among other things, the view that the Russian mafia has already seized control over the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. In view of the steadily growing number of signals about the import of international organized crime to our territory, we asked Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner and Nikolay Trutsuk, councillor at the Russian Federation Embassy in Slovakia, to comment.

L. Pittner: The Slovak Ministry of Interior recently signed an agreement on cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. It did so for the very reasons that have prompted the FBI to seek the signing of an analogous agreement. Indeed, there exist serious indications that the Russian mafia (or mafia from the republics of the former USSR) operates also in Slovakia. This finds its expression in activities such as drug-trafficking and the theft of automobiles and their transfer to the eastern parts of Europe and other areas, about which we have only signals from intelligence sources thus far, which makes it difficult to be more specific. The findings of the interior ministries of a number of countries show that the operation of these mafias is becoming a problem, with which not only the United States but also the whole world, in fact, will have to deal with all due

seriousness. As for the formulation that the Russian mafia has seized control over Slovakia, it is, I think, too strong a term, which is perhaps also due to a certain "journalistic inventiveness." The situation cannot be characterized in that way. However, the existence of certain indiciations about the mafia's operation is a fact.

N. Trutsuk: First of all, I would like to object to the term "Russian mafia," which is being used in the local press more and more frequently even if the authors of the relevant articles usually have in mind criminal elements from all of the Commonwealth of Independent States republics. I am able to state with all responsibility that, according to our statistics and findings, citizens of the Russian Federation or of Russian nationality represent a negligible fraction of the foreign nationals who commit criminal activity on the territory of Slovakia. As regards the alleged statements by the FBI director, I dare claim that it is probably another journalistic hoax, similar to the one fabricated recently by the correspondent of a certain news agency about the alleged statement by a World Bank representative regarding the situation in four Slovak banks. Had some international mafia really seized control of Slovakia, your authorities responsible for the security situation in the country would have sounded the alarm a long time ago. If they have not, it apparently means that they have no reason to do so.

MOS Rejects Coalition Under Coexistence Terms

AU0706135794 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 3 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by "vg": "Hungarian Civic Party: Coexistence Offer Is a Belated April Fools Joke"]

[Text] K. Petocz, secretary of the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] for foreign relations, yesterday described as a belated April fools joke the Coexistence Movement's offer for the conclusion of a three-member [ethnic Hungarian] coalition without the participation of MOS leadership members on the common slate of candidates. "This cannot be a serious political gesture," he said. MOS Chairman L. Nagy assesses [Coexistence Chairman Miklos] Duray's movement's attitude as an attempt to eliminate a competitor. "It is like cutting off an athlete's arms and legs and putting him on the starting line," he said. At the same time, however, he conceded that, so far, MOS has not been informed through official channels of the conclusions of the Coexistence Republic Council's meeting [at Lucenec on 28 May], which it knows only from media reports. According to Petocz, Coexistence representatives should finally start behaving like politicians and stop acting like offended persons. Otherwise, he stressed, it might happen that the Hungarian minority will not be represented in parliament at all. "And that would mean an additional 20 deputies for Meciar and the Slovak National Party," he said. MOS Chairman Nagy observed in this context that not only the Hungarian minority would be placed at a disadvantage in that case but also the whole of Slovakia, which, owing to the irresponsibility of a handful of people, would acquire the reputation of a country that is intolerant toward ethnic minorities.

Union Leaders Deny Electoral Pact With HZDS

AU0706121494 Bratislava SME in Slovak 3 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by "bor": "The Confederation of Trade Unions Will Not Go Into the Elections With the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia"]

[Text] Alojz Englis, president of the Confederation of Trade Unions [KOZ], Vladimir Stevko, vice president of KOZ, and J. Blahak yesterday denied reports that the KOZ leadership would go into the elections "in the colors of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]." Even if they received such an offer, they would not consider it, they said.

General: Army Blundered in Forming Army Command

AU0706125094 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 Jun 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "There Will Be a General Staff"]

[Text] Bratislava—The transformation of the Army Command of the Slovak Republic into the General Staff is being pursued within the framework of the first stage of implementing the Concept of Building the Army of the Slovak Republic up to the Year 2000. This change should be carried out this year but no later than next year, Major General Julius Humaj, commander of the Army of the Slovak Republic, told the TA SR yesterday. Following experience with a similar arrangement of West European armies, the change will mainly affect internal organizational structures. General Humaj described the formation of the Army Command as one of the mistakes made in drafting the concept and structure of the newly established Republic's armed forces.

Agreement on Military Truck Venture With India

AU0706123294 Bratislava SME in Slovak 3 Jun 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Indian-Slovak Enterprise"]

[Text] The Tatra Sipox a.s. [shareholding company] at Banovce nad Bebravou and BEML, the largest Indian manufacturer of military equipment, reached a preliminary agreement on the founding of a joint venture yesterday. This was announced by Jozef Majsky, president of Tatra Sipox a.s., and confirmed by M. Mallikarjun, Indian minister of state for defense. The joint venture will produce trucks using Indian engines and Tatra chassis and cabins. They will be assembled partly in Slovakia and partly in India.

[Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak on 3 June on page 2 carries a 100-word report on the Indian minister's visit to Banovce nad Bebravou, which quotes Tatra Sipox President Majsky as saying that the joint venture should produce "at least 2,000 vehicles a year over a period of five years."]

Peto: Coalition Negotiations 'Very Promising'

LD0706150694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] A fully constructive approach and complete openness has characterized the coalition negotiations today. This was stated by Gyula Horn at a press briefing after the talks. Ivan Peto also said that what was achieved is very promising. The two sides agreed on most issues. Kata Peli Nagy reports on today's coalition negotiations.

[Begin Peto recording] What is behind us suggests a very promising and effective negotiation process over the coming days. We thought virtually identically about the majority of issues. [end recording]

[Nagy] This is how Ivan Peto, chairman of the Alliance of Free Demicrats [SZDSZ], and Gyula Horn, his Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] counterpart, assessed briefly the first round of government coalition negotiations this morning. [passage omitted]

[Begin Horn recording] I must say that a fully constructive approach and complete openness toward each other has characterized the talks this morning, and we were able to come to an agreement very quickly. Naturally, tough and long debates can be expected on questions of content, but we agree—and we agreed on this too—that the date for convening the National Assembly is a firm framework for us, to which we would like to adhere under all circumstances. [end recording]

[Nagy] This means that work in the expert committees must be completed by 20 June. The two sides would like to conclude the coalition agreement before 24 June. In this way there is a chance for the new government to be formed at the end of the month.

Committee Leaders Named

LD0706202194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] According to the most recent reports, the coalition talks between the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], which began this morning, will continue on 9 June. If everything proceeds according to the schedule just accepted, and if the sides are able to agree on the details, the new Hungarian Government could be set up by the end of the month. Here is a report by Kata Peli-Nagy on the press briefing by [MSZP Chairman] Gyula Horn and [SZDSZ Chairman] Ivan Peto.

[Begin Horn recording] We agreed that we would set up experts committees for the purpose of coordinating, working out, and finalizing the individual topics. [end recording]

[Peli-Nagy] In accordance with the announcement made by the MSZP's prime ministerial candidate, Gyula Horn, the coalition talks begun today will be continued and the government agreement will be prepared in 10 committees. The MSZP and the SZDSZ each charged one leading expert with continuing the discussions.

The leaders of the working group dealing with economic policy issues are Laszlo Bekesi [MSZP] and Marton Tardos [SZDSZ]. The leaders of the agricultural committee are Laszlo Lakos [MSZP] and Pal Juhasz [SZDSZ]. Those heading the committee dealing with health and social issues are Pal Kovacs [MSZP] and Andrea Szolnoki [SZDSZ]. The leaders of the committee on cultural, minority, and church policy are Gyoergy Janosi [MSZP] and Gabor Fodor [SZDSZ]. The discussion of issues concerning public law and safety will be led by Zoltan Gal [MSZP] and Peter Hack [SZDSZ]. Ferenc Baja [MSZP] and Ferenc Wekler [SZDSZ] are dealing with self-government issues. Laszlo Kovacs [MSZP] and Istvan Szent-Ivanyi [SZDSZ] are dealing with foreign and security policy; Mrs Kosa, nee Magda Kovacs [MSZP], and Tamas Bauer [SZDSZ] are dealing with social interest coordination.

A separate committee will discuss the government structure, and it will be headed by Imre Szekeres [MSZP] and Gabor Kuncze [SZDSZ]. Imre Szekeres and Balint Magyar [SZDSZ] will discuss the coalition agreement guarantees.

The leaders of the committees are not the individual parties' minister-designates. The work could involve experts too. This was said by Gyula Horn, and then he added:

[Begin Horn recording] We would like the experts committees to schedule their work so that the first version of the coalition agreement will be prepared by 20 June, so that we can put the final touches on it, and so that it will be ready for signing, at the latest, by 24 June. I must say that this discussion was characterized by a fully constructive approach. We thought in a virtually identical manner concerning the great majority of issues. [end recording]

[Peto] I would also like to highlight what Gyula Horn said—that what we have experienced indicates extremely encouraging and very effective talks in the future. Naturally, tough and long debates can be expected in the questions of content, but we agree—and we agreed on this too—that the date for convening the National Assembly is a firm framework for us to which we would like to adhere under all circumstances.

SZDSZ Leader Kuncze Views Coalition Talks

AU0706180394 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 6 Jun 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Gabor Kuncze, acting parliamentary group leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Anna Dano; place and date not given: "It Is Not Worth It for the Power Alone—What Are the Guarantees of Cooperation?"]

[Text] On 5 June the convention of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] made a decision behind closed doors and gave authorization to the executive body to start talks on forming a government with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]. When the coalition talks are completed, the SZDSZ will decide at another convention whether to approve the draft coalition agreement. We interviewed Gabor Kuncze, a leading member of the SZDSZ, on the conditions set by the Free Democrats.

[Dano] Do you still see yourself as a prime ministerial candidate?

[Kuncze] After the second round of elections, the Free Democrats do not have a chance to name a prime ministerial candidate.

[Dano] Were there any concrete facts in the Socialists' offer for negotiations?

[Kuncze] There were not any. However, we assume that both sides are open and ready to make compromises, and that they are thinking in terms of the whole negotiating package. Within this, we have to have detailed talks on the program of governmental cooperation and the elements of efficient governmental and parliamentary work, and we have to decide on personnel and the distribution of the ministries.

[Dano] Is it possible that the person filling the presidential post will also be discussed?

[Kuncze] If this issue is raised then the SZDSZ insists on Arpad Goncz.

[Dano] Do you disregard the SZDSZ's former statement that [MSZP Chairman] Horn's nomination for prime minister might stop the SZDSZ from entering the coalition? Generally, can any of the MSZP's offers make the SZDSZ accept Horn as prime minister?

[Kuncze] The SZDSZ has not yet withdrawn this statement but the situation is fundamentally different. The MSZP gained an absolute majority and we have to take this into consideration at our talks.

[Dano] Can the MSZP give guarantees for a liberal economic policy?

[Kuncze] It is not worth partaking of power for power's sake alone. The stake of the negotiations is whether the SZDSZ can receive guarantees that make it possible to implement elements of our ideas—naturally, through compromises. If these guarantees do not exist then the SZDSZ must not enter the coalition because, in this situation, it would only be given various positions. A guarantee could be if the principle of majority voting cannot automatically prevail in the coalition. My meaning is that the SZDSZ's effective influence in the governmental work must not become doubtful. Therefore, at the negotiations, both sides will have to show a large degree of willingness for compromise, and empathy, and the talks will have to be conducted with absolute openness and goodwill.

[Dano] Do you think it possible that the economic ministries will be merged in the new government?

[Kuncze] The governmental structure will be an issue at the coalition talks. According to the SZDSZ, one person has to be responsible for the economic policy within the government. One kind of economic policy is needed, rather than three kinds that characterized the previous government's activities. The question is whether the economic top minister should be responsible for the economic ministry or the finance ministry.

[Dano] Do you insist on having one of the economic ministries to yourselves?

[Kuncze] Again, we can only answer this during the negotiations. The size of the MSZP's majority cannot be questioned. This has to be accepted and the ministries have to be distributed accordingly. On the other hand, the MSZP obviously accepts that it is only worth for the SZDSZ to enter into a coalition if it can also be given important ministries. These can also be economic ones.

[Dano] You mentioned that you will reconsider the governmental structure at the negotiations. Is it possible that establishing a position of deputy prime minister will be raised?

[Kuncze] This position might be created. If it is then the constitution has to be amended because this position is not in it. If this position is created then the deputy prime minister will also be responsible for the activities of other ministries, but he will not have the right to instruct other ministers.

[Dano] Do you require any of the ministries of armed forces?

[Kuncze] It would not be fortunate to insist on anything in advance. However, the SZDSZ would be capable of supervising the Interior Ministry.

[Dano] What are your views on the suggestion that the MSZP would subordinate the civil secret service to the Interior Ministry?

[Kuncze] Numerous versions are possible. For us it is inconceivable that a minister without portfolio should continue to be responsible for this area. However, it is not certain that the Interior Ministry is the best place for the secret service. It might be better placed in the Justice Ministry.

[Dano] Would you ban government party deputies questioning the ministers in parliament?

[Kuncze] This cannot be banned because this ensures the independence of the deputies. However, we would not like the government party deputies to question the ministers in parliament and take the opportunity away from the opposition deputies. Questions to ministers are the most important tool of the opposition. However, the government party deputies have to be given the opportunity to turn to the minister in a given situation and the

minister has to be compelled to give an answer within a certain period of time. If the minister's reply cannot be accepted then the problem has to be dealt with in the parliamentary groups.

Horn: Rightist Parties 'Failed' in Europe

AU0606171294 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Jun 94 pp 145-146

[Interview with Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "'The Parties of the Right Have Failed'"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Horn, your serious car accident is quite obviously still bothering you a lot.

[Horn] I am much better now, even though this appliance, which weighs 7 kg, does create certain difficulties, particularly in bed. But let us talk about politics.

[DER SPIEGEL] What Hungary's goulash communism failed to accomplish in decades in power was achieved by the first freely elected conservative government: With their first election victory, the former Communists are now more popular than ever.

[Horn] What can be so bad about 54 percent of Hungarians having cast their vote in favor of us Socialists? The overwhelming majority of voters are salary-earners and employees; all in all, the election result reflects the reality of the structure of Hungarian society.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does this not sound like the former Lenin disciple Horn, who, although he cut through the barbed wire at the border with Austria in 1989, thus making it possible for thousands of GDR refugees to leave the country, has stuck to socialist ideas at the same time?

[Horn] By asking such a question you are ruling out that man learns from experience. My process of rethinking did not only start yesterday or the day before. I was one of those who sought and found contacts with West European social-democratic parties as early as in the mid-seventies, primarily with the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD]. Therefore, in the course of the years, we went through the school of social democracy, studying in practice the social market economy, pluralist democracy, and the thinking that is guided by free enterprises....

[DER SPIEGEL] And then you forfeited the people's trust. In 1990 people voted against the old system without knowing the new one, while now the Hungarians seem to be longing for the old days.

[Horn] I do not want to rule out that our success does not have to be attributed in parts also to a certain longing for the past security people had in their lives. Yet the people do not want to return to state ownership or the one-party system, they only want competent experts now. The current government has speeded up our victory through its stupid policy. This is what highlighted the contrast between what we stood for and the anachronism of these politicians even more. The Hungarian right even tried to arouse a nostalgia for the arch-conservative Horthy regime instead of meeting the challenges of our time.

[DER SPIEGEL] You do not have any problems with turncoats and old single-party cliques?

[Horn] Of course, we also have them in Hungary. I have heard of people who now all of a sudden address others with comrade again, while only one year ago they would have protested against it. But any deal requires two persons. It depends on the party whether we will tolerate nepotism and whom we rely on for support.

[DER SPIEGEL] Corruption is also widespread in Hungary. Can you say with a clear conscience that there were no irregularities in the way the assets of the former Communist Party were dealt with, and that you are morally legitimized to control these machinations?

[Horn] Excuse me—the Socialist Party has given account of the former party assets to the very last penny. This has been confirmed by both the state prosecutor and the Audit Court. Apart from that, I can promise only one thing: We are firmly determined to fight mercilessly against any form of state corruption, and to depose from office anyone from among the ranks of our party who is even faintly suspected of corruption.

[DER SPIEGEL] Four years ago the conservatives made similar promises; a little later the reforms got stuck. Everyday life became dominated by the shadow economy and Mafia-like structures. Is there not a danger that the Socialists could suffer the same fate?

[Horn] Despite the absolute majority, we intend to rule in a coalition. I am starting from the assumption that we will submit an offer to this effect to the Alliance of Free Democrats, since our programs are similar in many points. A social-liberal coalition might create a wide democratic basis. We want to enter into vivid dialogue with society, and practice a new political style.

[DER SPIEGEL] Will Hungary's relations with its neighbors change, relations that have been tense for a long time as a result of Hungarian minorities?

[Horn] What we will not change in our foreign policy is Hungary's Western orientation, in which I would like to give priority to Hungarian-German relations. Should I become prime minister, my first journey will probably take me to Bonn. Hungary's further fate will depend to a large degree on whether we manage to intensify relations with Germany. Moreover, we need a better associate membership agreement with the European Union [EU]. Then we must also seek a new beginning in our relations particularly with Romania and Slovakia, countries with which our problems have deteriorated regarding the Hungarian minorities.

[DER SPIEGEL] Will Budapest give the signal for further victories by reformist Communists in the former East bloc?

[Horn] I do not think that the voters in any country will look to their neighbors for election results. There is not a trend toward the left in eastern Europe; the only thing that matters is that the right-wing conservative parties have failed everywhere in this part of Europe. This should really be their problem.

MDF's Konya Views Party's Role, Objectives

AU0606172194 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 3 Jun 94 p 12

[Interview with Imre Konya, interior minister and deputy chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Jeno Balasko; place and date not given: "With a Free Spirit and an Open Heart"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Balasko] What changes do you see as necessary in working out the new policy of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]? By this, I mean the modernity of Jozsef Antall's views and the presence of possible different desires. Can we expect theoretical-principled conflicts within the MDF, as well as contradictions regarding the methods? Can we also expect possible personal conflicts?

[Konya] This is a complex question. Of course, various demands for change, realistic or unrealistic endeavors—including individual ambitions—and a seemingly easy cure-all, as well as realistic proposals emerge after such a serious defeat. I know that the MDF should feel neither despair nor hope in the existence of a cure that will allow us to avoid the slow and tough work that is absolutely necessary for victory in the next elections. I declare that this is an attainable goal. I also declare that the MDF could benefit from its new position in opposition because, slowly overcoming the big social shocks, the MDF must become a party open to all strata of our society. [passage omitted]

[Balasko] Where is the MDF heading?

[Konya] The voters who probably did not vote in favor of one party or another out of conviction are somewhere in the center. Most such voters, about 30 percent, constantly fluctuate between various parties, depending on which group has a lesser aggressive effect on them both economically and rhetorically. We must win these people over. So, openness also means the widening of our support, but it also means that the the circle of MDF members and sympathizers should be based on a wider strata if possible. We can achieve all this if we get rid of the exaggerated ideological limitations. People who become paralyzed from the constant declaration of values also have a place among us. [passage omitted]

Apart from compromise, there is no other alternative for the MDF parliamentary faction. In order to the win the majority, we have to become a bourgeois center party that conducts a policy along national interests and is also open to every citizen, a party that authentically represents those we call the silent majority. The members of the expected government coalition have already signalled their intention to modify or legislate at least 200 laws in Parliament as soon as possible. Most people who are members of the MDF parliamentary faction are practical experts. Obviously, a pragmatism that brings a concrete legislative activity instead of seemingly ideological debates will have to be really asserted in Parliament. In the course of this activity, we will have to create a steady coordination and close daily cooperation with the other opposition factions. We should not play a negative role in Parliament; on the contrary: With the limited means of the opposition, we must endeavor to continue to contribute to Hungary's development and its catching up with the developed world.

Opinion Poll on Election Result, Coalition

AU0606203594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Jun 94 pp 1, 4

[Report by Endre Hann]

[Text] On 29 May the voters gave an absolute majority to the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]. The past week was noisy with the speculations and explanations of politicians and political analysts. However, after a few days, what is society's view on its own decision and what does it expect from the winners? The Median Public Opinion and Market Research Institute sought the answer to these question in a public opinion survey carried out on 1 June, which showed expectations in connection with the MSZP and an immense desire for a coalition.

Three days after the second round, a sweeping majority (95 percent) of electors was aware that the MSZP had won the elections. The majority of people were also familiar with the size of the victory: Nearly one-third (30 percent) of the electors precisely named the proportion of mandates at 54 percent, and one-fifth (22 percent) was almost exactly aware of the proportion (51-53 percent). Only 12 percent estimated the MSZP's result below the absolute majority, and 16 percent presumed a bigger majority than the actual result.

The absolute majority of the public was surprised by the final result of the elections. A significant majority of only the MSZP's voters (who had voted for the MSZP list on 8 May) claimed that they had expected such a large victory, but even among them, every third person admitted that he was surprised by the result. A similar division can also be seen in qualifying the MSZP's victory: As opposed to three-quarters of the MSZP voters, only one-quarter of the other parties' supporters believed that the result was "good for the country."

A significant section of society has great expectations, almost illusions, toward the MSZP government. Almost two-thirds of citizens expect that the Socialists will sooner or later increase pensions, and almost half expect wage increases, price reductions, and relatively quick results in solving other social and economic problems.

Among the MSZP's voters, the proportion of optimists reaches the absolute majority in the case of all tasks.

At the same time, the majority of the public is thinking in terms of a coalition, rather than a one-party MSZP government: Three out of four people would like a multiparty government. Some 82 percent of the latter named the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] as a desirable coalition partner, and 25 percent would also welcome the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz] and 14 percent the Independent Smallholders Party in the new government.

Regardless of their party affiliations, the majority of people are in favor of coalition, a small difference only exists in the proportions: "Only" 70 percent of the MSZP voters "wish for a partner," while 91 percent of the SZDSZ voters believe that their party should be in government.

While society is almost united in supporting the idea of a coalition, it is much more divided about the most suitable person to become prime minister. It might not be surprising that, after the decline preceding the elections, [MSZP Chairman] Gyula Horn again enjoys the support of a relative majority, however, it is noteworthy that two "candidates" approach his popularity. It is especially interesting that [former Prime Minister] Miklos Nemeth still has significant support and he even has a slight lead over [SZDSZ prime ministerial candidate] Gabor Kuncze. Apart from "nostalgia," this, of course, has other reasons, too: According to 77 percent of the people questioned, "it is important for the prime minister virtually to be an economic expert," and only 23 percent saw this as a negligible factor.

Walesa's Reelection Strategy, Possible Opponents

WS0706143794 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik and Wojciech Zaluska: "Presidential Campaign; Loneliness of a Long-Distance Runner"]

[Text] *Lech Walesa has announced that he will run in next year's presidential election. Why did he do it so soon?*

It could be just an accident. The journalists asked, so he replied. The president is an impulsive man; he likes fast responses.... But he is also capable of waiting. He has proved that many times, like in the 1980's, for instance. So one could assume that his statement to PAP was made deliberately.

Candidates' Worries

Walesa has to start off his campaign very early. An enormous amount of work is ahead of him. A year and a half before the elections, he has neither political backing nor popularity. Without appropriate structures, he will not be able to collect money or organize rallies or put up posters.... He will not win without the electorate's support. He needs time to bounce off the bottom.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, who is leading in presidential popularity polls, has a completely different worry on his mind: His problem is to maintain the popularity and not to allow the voters to get bored with him. That is why he is dragging his feet, and he does not want to begin the campaign yet.

Stocktaking of Supporters

By announcing his decision, Walesa is trying to force Kwasniewski and other competitors to disclose their intentions...and to make mistakes. After all, the candidates will be under the particularly watchful eye of the mass media and the voters. Currently, it is the president's blunders that get the biggest publicity.

Walesa also most probably wants to conduct a "stocktaking" of his supporters. He wants to check whether he can count on the support of someone else apart from the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms.

True, it is known widely that he has supporters in different parties (for instance, the Christian-National Union, the Peasant Accord, and Solidarity), but it is also known that these supporters are few and far between. Perhaps by submitting his candidacy the president wants to force them to be more active. He is probably thinking: "Even if they fail to win their parties for me, they could at least prevent them from coming up with countercandidates."

He Abuses People and Then He Dumps Them

Do such tactics have a chance of being successful? For the moment, rather not. Unfriendly feelings toward Walesa within the post-Solidarity camp are just too high. He is regarded as a high-risk investment, as a politician who "abuses people and then dumps them." A right-wing leader recently compared the president to a coachman who, while fleeing to escape wolves, is giving more and more of his passengers to the prey of the wolves, one by one. Is it any wonder that nobody wants to ride Walesa's coach?

The style of his presidency—that is, the policy of constant "wars at the top"—also arouses enormous reservations. If Walesa wants to dream of a big political camp, he must change his style. And perhaps he also must change the composition of his chancellery. But will he agree to sacrifice [presidential aide] Mieczyslaw Wachowski in return for his reelection? And will that be enough?

Directly to Voters

If the parties turn their backs on Walesa, he will address the electorate directly. He will tour Poland, he will organize rallies. He feels best as a people's tribune. Nobody talks to crowds better than he.

He will definitely not give up on television, either. He will be launching attacks on the National Radio and Television Council and [Television Chairman] Wieslaw Walendziak. He will try to replace them or to force them to be obedient.

The campaign of a lonely Walesa will be more populist. It will definitely be anticommunist. But will it also be antimarket? So far, two slogans have been hanging above the president's bed: First of all Walesa, and second of all—capitalism.

Polonia Invites Pawlak for U.S. Visit

WS0806105194 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Tomasz Wroblewski from Washington: "Peasant Activists' Secret Diplomacy"]

[Text] *Behind the back of the Foreign Affairs Ministry [MSZ], Prime Minister Pawlak is getting ready for a visit to the United States. The trip, to take part in a session of the Congress of American Polonia [KPA], is being organized by Franciszek Mleczko, Pawlak's adviser. The Polish Peasant Party is hoping to get the support of the KPA in the future presidential election.*

Chairman Edward Moskal has confirmed that he invited Prime Minister Pawlak to come to the United States. The invitation was tentatively accepted during Moskal's recent visit to Poland. Franciszek Mleczko, adviser to the prime minister, has gone to Chicago. He is supposed to make preparations for the prime minister's visit during a KPA anniversary session in October.

In a conversation with ZYCIE WARSZAWY, Chairman Moskal did not rule out that Mleczko's visit and the subsequent visit by Pawlak during the congress in Buffalo will be used in electoral political games and that they

could be interpreted as KPA support for the extreme left wing. "That is always possible," Moskal said, but he immediately added: "I have been called a communist before, and my advice to them is to watch what they say when they call people communist."

During martial law [introduced in 1981] and the period of official boycott of agencies of the Polish People's Republic by Polonia, Chairman Moskal was accused of maintaining personal contacts with communist diplomats. Accusations even appeared in Polonia newspapers, regarding Moskal's trade ties to communists consuls in Chicago.

Mleczko is to be the main speaker at KPA's board of directors session scheduled to begin today. When Moskal was asked by ZYCIE WARSZAWY how he managed to reconcile Mleczko's left-wing views and communist past with the traditionally anticommunist positions taken by KPA activists, he replied: "Our forum is open to people of many ideologies and with different pasts."

Up to now, representatives from no other party have been invited to the congress or to the Chicago meeting of the board. Chairman Moskal says that this is explained by the fact that Mleczko is in Chicago as Prime Minister Pawlak's and the government's representative, not as a representative of "his party." Neither the embassy in Washington nor the MSZ in Warsaw has been officially notified about the prime minister's plans or Mleczko's visit.

In a conversation with ZYCIE WARSZAWY, KPA activists and directors, who asked to remain anonymous, expressed their complete surprise and concern over the intentions of the KPA chairman.

Prime Minister Reportedly Available on Internet

WS0706143694 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 28-29 May 94 p 2

[Article by krzem, irem, PAP: "premier@urm.gov.pl; Mr. Prime Minister on Computer"]

[Text] If you have a computer, a telephone, and a modem and pay 1.5 million zlotys [Z] to open an account on the Internet and Z1.5 million a month in subscription fees, from today on you can send your opinions to Prime Minister Pawlak.

It will be enough to put the following address: premier@urm.gov.pl. You can also write it in English—primeminister@urm.gov.pl.—and it will reach the addressee as well.

The prime minister gave these addresses yesterday in the government's holiday center in Lansk, during the Forum of the Association for the Development of Open Systems, which was held in Lansk. Pawlak is the second high-ranking politician who has revealed his address on the Internet. The other one is U.S. President Bill Clinton, who made his address available on the Internet a year ago: president@whitehouse.gov. The first message Prime Minister Pawlak sent was greetings to President Clinton.

How does it work? All of the computers in the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] (including the ones that are on the desk of the prime minister) are linked to one another by a so-called network. Their users can send messages to each other.

Yesterday, URM joined the world Internet system, a huge computer network that already includes 65 countries (such as the U.S., Canada, the countries of Western Europe, Japan, and, for over a year—Poland). In America, increasingly more companies give not only their fax numbers but also their addresses in the computer mail (so-called e-mail).

Where did the Internet come from? More than 10 years ago, the Pentagon tasked research institutes and armament enterprises with creating a system of computer communications. One university after another joined the system so the network became available to all scientists. Recently, it has even become available to every owner of a personal computer, a modem, and a telephone.

In Poland, the users of this network are mainly universities and institutes—35,000 people in 220 institutions. The installation costs are covered by the Scientific Research Committee. Other users (a few dozen, including GAZETA) must pay Z1.5 million to open an account in the network, and a monthly subscription fee of Z1.5 million. The system is installed by the Warsaw-based company ATM.

Katowice Strike Results in Heavy Losses

LD0806094494 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0100 GMT 8 Jun 94

[Text] Justyna Matyskiewicz, head of the Katowice Steelworks information office, has announced that, during the first six days of the strike, the plant suffered losses amounting to 40.78 billion zlotys [Z]. According to her, each subsequent day of the strike will result in further losses of about Z10 billion.

Late last night, the strike committee began talks with the board of the steelworks. The talks are not being conducted face-to-face but, rather, through mediators from the Ministry for Ownership Transformations. There are signs that an agreement can eventually be reached.

Slovak Minority Leader on Absence of Rights

AU0706121394 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 3 Jun 94 p 1

[TA SR report: "No Guarantee of Rights; On the Position of the Slovak Minority in Poland"]

[Text] Warsaw—An estimated 15,000-20,000 Slovaks live in Poland at present. But the number of those who

no longer identify with their Slovak origin is twice as large. However, the Slovak minority in Poland does not represent a problem on the scale, for example, of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. "During the reform of the entire state administration, we were practically left to our own devices. We do not have any rights guaranteed by the Constitution and a law on minorities does not exist in Poland," Lubomir Molitoris, secretary of the Central Committee of the Cultural and Social Association of Czechs and Slovaks in Poland, said about the present position of the Slovak minority in Poland.

Some protection is somewhat noticeable in the sphere of education, where a Ministry of Education decree is in force on the principles of minority education and maintaining a national identity.

Left-Wing, Right-Wing Local Election Policies

WS0806104794 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 8 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by "SAR": "A Sluggish Campaign; Not Much Time Left Before Self-Government Elections"]

[Text] *On 19 September [date as published], local communities will elect 52,000 local council members. Research conducted so far indicates that the level of interest shown in the elections is not too high, especially in rural areas and small towns.*

It is precisely in those areas that the deadline for registering electoral lists has been postponed because there were no volunteers to be candidates to the gmina [small administrative unit] councils. It seems that coalition politicians are showing moderate interest in the election campaign and that they leave its implementation up to local activists. Most probably they thought that they had carried out all possible propaganda measures for the sake of their parties earlier in the Sejm. On the other hand, the efforts of extraparliamentary right-wing parties are concentrated precisely on the elections and on warning the voters against an impending disaster which, according to those right-wing parties, a potential postcommunist victory would be.

Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski, leader of the Conservative Coalition, says that the left-wing program is directed against self-government, while a left-wing victory in the elections may mean a return to power of people with shameful pasts. He added that the main goal of the right-wing camp in the communal elections is to prevent postcommunist forces from taking over local authority in Poland and an effective fight with the policies of gmina socialism. These declarations are characteristic of the election campaign being conducted by the right wing.

Donald Tusk, deputy chairman of the opposition Freedom Union [UW], is less emphatic in his warnings against the dangers of policies of the governing coalition, and he assures that UW will become a party that will be able to stop state-controlled socialism, which is resurgent in Poland today, while, in the self-government elections, UW will demonstrate it can achieve victory instead of just declaring ideas that are correct and wise.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke, leader of the Union of Real Politics, has decided to present a specific program in the campaign, which his local council members promise to implement in the gminas in which they expect to score a victory. He is calling for a repeal of the inheritance tax [podatek spadkowy] and an enfranchisement of residents of communal apartments. All religions of the world unanimously prohibit robbing widows and orphans. The inheritance tax is nothing but an outright immorality, says Korwin-Mikke.

The Democratic Left Alliance, as Aleksander Kwasniewski said recently, wants to score electoral success through persistent implementation of the electoral program, which is about striving for political stabilization, a reform of social policies that entails an active battle against unemployment, and using the international situation for Poland's joining European organizations. A majority of electoral programs by parties and coalitions has been voicing slogans that are equally abstract and hardly intelligible to the voters.

Kolodko Outlines 'Strategy for Poland' Program

LD0706151894 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1005 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] At a meeting today, the Council of Ministers is discussing a socioeconomic program for Poland for the next three years. Grzegorz Kolodko, deputy prime minister and minister of finance, describes the most important guidelines of the program, which has been given the title "The Strategy for Poland."

[Begin Kolodko recording] We want to dramatically step up the growth rate, finalize the macroeconomic stabilization, stabilize the system, and considerably improve living conditions. This is economic growth based mainly on investment and export expansion. The aim of the program is to reduce not only the rate of inflation but also the level of unemployment. By 1997 we want to reduce the unemployment level to less than 14 percent. As early as 1996, we want to reach a monthly inflation rate of not more than 1 percent, and, in 1997, we want to reduce the annual level of inflation to one figure.

The question, above all, is what is our target? We want to increase national income by about 22 percent over a four-year period. It is clear that almost all Poles should benefit from this rate of growth because the level of consumption will grow. This, I think, has gained us the support of the trade unions for the program. The investment capability of Polish economy will also increase, which, I believe, will be supported by business circles.

I am generally pleased that the Strategy for Poland is gaining support from both the working people and businessmen. I really think one can conduct an economic policy in this way, with support for what we want to do coming from both directions.

Goverment Releases Plan's Synthesis

LD0806033694 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1736 GMT 7 Jun 94

["Text" of a "synthesis" of the "Strategy for Poland" economic development program, released by the Government Press Office on 7 June]

[Text] Warsaw, 7 Jun—(1) Poland, opening up to the world, is continuing along its road toward democracy, toward a social market economy, and toward free enterprise by property sectors with equal rights. The distribution of the costs of transformation and the sharing out of their still limited results give rise to reservations. This is the spirit in which the public expressed itself during the last elections. Consequently, a reduction in the social costs of the reforms is a key issue for the government.

(2) Poland particularly needs a longer-term perspective today, a strategic conception of economic development that sets three objectives: rapid economic growth, institutional and macroeconomic stabilization, and an improved standard of living. That is precisely the kind of program the government is presenting to society, which is going to be implementing it in its own long-term interests. It is Strategy for Poland that opens a new phase of Poland's transformation.

(3) One of the fundamental values on which Strategy for Poland is based is the principle of distribution of results of labor through negotiation.

In principle, conflicts of interests in the economy occur between various social groups rather than between groups and the state or the government. The government proposes solutions that establish a partnerlike system of labor relations and wage regulation. This means a decentralized wage regulation mechanism based on negotiation, in which representatives of employers and employees conclude collective agreements, while the state plays the part of an arbitrator that settles disputes.

(4) Rapid economic growth should lead to an increase in the gross domestic product [GDP] in 1994-97 of about 22 percent; that is an annual average of about 5 percent (in constant prices). A speeding up of the current positive trends will be furthered through a policy of mobilizing national savings and, in addition, through foreign investments. An improvement in the efficiency of utilizing these resources will be assured through improved administration of the state assets, including the following:

—owner supervision exercised by the State Treasury, which will gain a separate institutional identity;

—widespread use of management contracts and agreements between state enterprises and tax offices;

—continuation of ownership transformations, including privatization and the State Investment Funds program.

Consolidation of development trends will be furthered through investment in human capital, especially in improving staff qualifications and employee retraining, as well as in scientific research and health care.

(5) Macroeconomic stabilization and institutional stability will meet the expectations of economic entities.

Its first aspect is the need to reduce the rate of growth of the public debt so that, prospectively, the debt does not exceed 60 percent of the GDP by 2004. This will be ensured through an increased domestic product and mainly through successive reductions of the budget deficit, which should fall to about 2-3 percent in 1997 from the level of more than 6 percent in 1992 and approximately 4 percent in 1994.

The debt will also be reduced through the use of mechanisms that turn some of it into shares in privatized state property. This will also lead to an acceleration of structural changes and an influx of foreign investment.

The second aspect of the policy of macroeconomic stabilization is the reduction of price inflation under the conditions of complete liberalization of prices. The financial policy is directed at reducing inflation to single figures in 1997. Reducing the rate of price increases, with a simultaneous policy of maintaining positive rates of interest in real terms, will promote a growing trend toward savings by all entities, stimulate investments, contribute toward growth in productivity, and reduce the costs of servicing the public debt.

The third aspect of macroeconomic stabilization is gradual balancing of the balance of payments and the current turnover account so that, in 1997, the continuing negative balance of this account should reach the level of 1.5 per cent of the GDP.

The government is consistently stabilizing the principles of economic play and the expectations of the entities that take part in it.

(6) Improving the standard of living is the social backbone of Strategy for Poland. Its successful implementation will make possible an increase of nearly 11 percent in the average real wage in 1994-97 and a perceptible increase in the purchasing power of the average old-age or disability pension after their increase by about 7 percent in real terms in 1994. The distribution of earnings has to guarantee for all at least an elementary sense of social safety, the loss of which in recent years has been the main cause of public frustration.

The government is undertaking the difficult and complex reform of the system of social protection that has been continually postponed for several years now. The realization of the intentions in the field of economic growth creates an opportunity for an effective and least painful implementation of this reform.

A program of active countermeasures against unemployment has been launched. Unemployment should decrease from nearly 16 percent now to under 14 percent

at the end of 1997. We are gradually entering a phase during which new—and often modern and competitive—jobs will be created more quickly than old jobs disappear.

(7) In the longer term, the international competitiveness of the economy is a measure of economic success and a source of cultural progress. Export production, as one of the forces that stimulate the economy and a source of financing for imports expenditure and efficient servicing of foreign debt, will be given institutional, especially financial, preferences.

One of the policy instruments improving the Polish producers' competitiveness will be an increased influx of foreign capital, especially of direct private investments.

(8) Poland is and always has been a part of Europe. Consequently, its striving for early membership in the European Union is natural. The realization of Strategy for Poland will bring us closer to this objective, especially as its direction is compatible with the long-term European Union program "Growth, Employment, Competitiveness."

The integrational experiences of the past three years, despite the financial assistance provided to Poland, have not been completely satisfactory. The time has come when our striving to participate in the European Union should be met with a greater opening of its markets. We, for our part, are intensifying adjustment activities, especially in agriculture.

(9) Reform of the economic center is a precondition for the realization of Strategy for Poland. A reform of the economic center will be carried out, consisting, among other things, of the establishment of a strong State Treasury, with a separate institutional identity, a Ministry of Economy, and a Ministry of International Economic Integration.

(10) Historical experiences of the countries that have already scored successes in the economic field clearly show that the sources of success were hard work by society and enlightened policies by those in power.

We also need lasting social peace. In time, the results of Strategy for Poland will ensure such peace themselves. Today, however, we also need the goodwill of all proreform forces. These store tremendous social energy. This has to be focused on creative efforts directed to the future.

An integral part of Strategy for Poland are 10 crucial programs. These are directed at specific issues and operations. Apart from these, the government package contains sets of sector and departmental programs, as well as economic and social policies, the implementation of which are the responsibility of specific ministries. By assigning specific tasks to economic ministries, Strategy for Poland itself focuses on the crucial problems and a macroeconomic and macrosocial approach.

Cabinet Approves Plan

WS0806105094 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Jun 94 p 10

[Article by Ina Boruszewska: "Council of Ministers—'Strategy for Poland'; Government Approved Kolodko's Economic Program"]

[Text] *"Kolodko's Plan" envisages an increase in the GDP by about 22 percent over three years, a drop in inflation to below 10 percent, longer retirement pensions for the elderly, and longer education for the young. Yesterday, the government approved the program.*

The strategic economic program of Grzegorz Kolodko, finance minister and deputy prime minister, forecasts that, within three years, rapid economic growth will take place and will bring about an improvement in living conditions. "Negotiation principles of the distribution of the results of labor" were declared as a "fundamental value" of the program. This is supposed to decrease the social cost of the reforms. So a partnershiplike salary system is being proposed through new, collective labor agreements that would be in accordance with standards of the European Union. General decisions will be made during sessions of the Trilateral Commission for Socio-economic Issues (government-trade unions-employers), whose legal status is to be defined shortly.

Rapid economic growth should lead to an increase in the GDP by about 22 percent by 1997. "Mobilization of domestic savings, foreign investments, and efficient management of state-owned wealth" will be conducive to that end. For the purpose of managing state-owned wealth, an Agency of State Treasury Property is to be established, which will supervise ownership of state-owned enterprises transformed into Commercial Law companies. The National Investment Fund Program is to be continued, but Kolodko's program does not include a single word on reprivatization. A governmental draft law on reimbursements got stuck at the stage of "inter-ministry negotiations."

To Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko, macroeconomic stabilization is the most important thing. It is linked to the need to reduce the rate of increase of the public debt (so that it does not exceed 60 percent of the GDP by the year 2004) and to reduce the budget deficit (from 4 percent in 1994 to 2-3 percent in 1997).

Minister Justifies Need for Strategy

WS0706143594 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 11 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Finance Minister Grzegorz W. Kolodko under the "Answers and Questions" rubric: "Situation Used To Be Worse"]

[Text] As it is opening up to the world, Poland is proceeding on its road to democracy, to a social market economy, and to the free enterprise of sectors with equal

rights. To strengthen this process, we now need a strategic concept of long-term economic development. We have lacked such a concept for years; the economic policy, especially the financial policy, which was supposed to resolve only short-term problems, in fact resolved only some problems, while at the same time creating new ones. Today these problems are stacking up so much that we need a new complex approach. Otherwise, the achievements of the transformation made so far will be seriously jeopardized.

One might pretend that it is still possible to increase unemployment or the internal public debt, that all foreign credit can easily be accepted, and that the present system of social insurances does not have to be changed. It might be assumed that economic growth will be maintained without reinforcing the people's tendency to save money, that simply giving state property to people is the road to an efficiency-oriented privatization, that there are not very many poor people, and that all the rich people are doing nothing but trying to get hold of the finance minister to pay him their taxes. Things were and still are different from that. This is why we need an active economic and social policy that would provide a foundation for the creative work that will have to be done by all of us. The directions of this policy are presented in the Strategy for Poland, which will find its way to the Sejm this week.

We are entering a new phase of transformations. Its main characteristics are: lowering the social costs of the reforms, adding dynamism to the economy, and effecting systemic stabilization. An economic strategy is also necessary to make the growth trends lasting and balanced. To achieve this, it is indispensable to lengthen the period during which the economic policy is carried out. Transforming work relationships, reforming the social insurance system, mobilizing the country's savings, granting equal rights to all ownership sectors, establishing a higher level of international competitiveness, improving the security of the economic turnover—these are the key elements of such a strategy. It stresses the establishment and development of institutions supporting a modern and functional market economy. So far we have reached a paradoxical situation in which public opinion places greater trust in "Solidarity '80" and "Self-Defense" than... in private banks.

The people feel lost. This is because the reality is changing from the vision that appeared five years ago. The people still do not have a clear picture of their future and do not know the path that leads to it. Statements concerning the lack of a so-called third road (actually, there are more than a dozen) suggest only a sharp alternative: either a return to the rejected past or simple continuation, ostensibly leading to capitalism at the cost of humility and subordination to the wisdom of those who call the shots in both politics and finance. Therefore, the people need an even more credible strategy of development over a longer period. When one wants to resolve problems that have piled up over generations, he cannot rely on short-term programs. The lack of a strategic approach in the past is one of the reasons for the current difficulties.

However, the people, who have for some time now been most frequently called "the electorate," which should make them protest, can make evaluations. Exactly five years ago they proved this in the elections, which, along with the results of the Roundtable, gave rise to a new stage in history. It seems that we were able to draw the right conclusions from that—not only in Poland. We should bear in mind, however, that government policies have already been evaluated several times since that breakthrough—in the following elections. Such a perception of the Polish process of transformations will probably be seen in the coming self-government elections as well. This is what this means, particularly in the context of economic and social policies:

First, it proves a lack of approval for the method of transforming the economy, the excessive costs of this process, and the distribution of these costs. One cannot try to persuade oneself and others that social dissatisfaction is caused by a wrong perception of the people, who cannot see that the situation is already better. Even if that were the case, what counts here is the state of social awareness, and it cannot be underestimated. The conviction that the situation has deteriorated emerges in this awareness only now, which is a clear delay. In other words, even though the real incomes and the level of consumption have been on the increase recently, the people are still comparing their living standards over a longer period. It is with a certain delay that they respond to the deterioration or improvement of those standards.

Second, the process of transformations is accompanied by an enormous redistribution of incomes and reserves. For most people this means poverty, for the minority—wealth. However, everyone is complaining, including the greatest material beneficiaries of the transformations. Recently only 7 percent of the people have admitted that their material situation has improved over the past year, whereas more than 50 percent claim that it is worse than it used to be. Material and social facts, unlike pieces of bad luck, do not happen at the same time.

Third, the state of dissatisfaction is caused by comparing reality with excessively aroused expectations. Today it turns out that even considerable economic growth—close to 10 percent in 1993 and 1994—and good prospects for the future are not only unable to offset the nearly 20-percent decrease in the GDP between 1989 and 1991 but also unable to wipe out the bad impression that was given by false declarations concerning the prospect of growth after only a six-month recession, or by empty promises, made several times, about lowering monthly inflation to less than 1 percent. The authors of these irresponsible declarations pretend that they have not been made at all; however, the people have not forgotten them. One cannot forget that, between September 1989 and September 1993, prices increased 40 times, and particularly that enormous redistribution was

made by mechanisms that have still not been accepted and that for many people are not even understandable. Only now have we been able to make a decision on decreasing the face value of the Polish zloty at the beginning of next year. This is an expression of the conviction that we will not swerve from the path of lowering inflation.

The view that in the transformations made so far it was possible to achieve more at a smaller cost no longer raises any serious doubts among independent observers and experts. The argument that in some other countries of the region the situation is worse than in Poland does not change either this evaluation or the conclusions resulting from it. If somewhere else the situation is worse, it is because the conditions are and were different there, and primarily because even more mistakes were made there, which is not a great comfort for us. Frankly, I do not fully understand why those who should be praised for their achievements and criticized for their mistakes keep rejecting this obvious conclusion. One must go hand in hand with the other, also in the future. Subjecting oneself to constructive criticism is an indispensable condition that offers a chance to avoid some potential mistakes in the future. I would like my presence on the hospitable pages of POLITYKA to serve this purpose.

ΩReaction to Amoco Withdrawal From Agreement

94P20852A

[Editorial Report] In a move that could forecast similar actions by other foreign oil companies investing in Poland, Amoco was reported in the 26 April RZECZPOSPOLITA, based on "unofficial sources," to be planning to withdraw from its agreement with the Polish Republic signed 2 October 1992 "to explore and exploit" oil and gas deposits following initial borings that located only "small amounts of gas." The Warsaw daily further reported that Amoco had purchased land parcels south of Lodz and also in the southeast of Poland near the border with Ukraine for $8 million. Amoco also planned, according to the report, to invest a further $22 million, a fact that was unofficially confirmed by Polish Oil and Gas Engineering (PGNiG). That information was seemingly contradicted by Eryk Mistewicz's article in the 15 May WPROST, entitled "Poland for the Poles," which reported that Amoco was "suspending" a much larger sum, "several hundreds of millions of dollars" worth of investments.

A second contract, allowing Amoco to search for methane in the hard-oal deposits of Upper Silesia, was, until recently, praised as the Ministry of Environmental Protection's "greatest accomplishment." WPROST noted that the company "retains the right to withdraw" from the second contract, although it is not clear if it indeed intends to do so. WPROST asserts that Amoco "had planned" to extract 5 billion cubic meters of methane annually, "with reserves estimated at 1.2 trillion cubic meters"—which would mean an investment of $2-3 million "in each of the 400-square kilometers of surface awarded in the concession," according to head geologist Michal Wilczynski. Sejm Deputy Radoslaw Gawlik of UW (Freedom Union) complains that, if Amoco withdraws from the contract, "the losses would be obvious," forcing Poland to continue reliance on Russian imports, amounting to "almost 7 billion cubic meters" annually. The Upper Silesian area would also get none of the "ecological relief" promised by Amoco production.

The Tax Exemption Issue

"Officially," Amoco representatives say one reason for their withdrawal is the issue of the "all too-short" tax exemption, RZECZPOSPOLITA reports, based on "well-informed sources." The current law, dated December 1988, allows companies with foreign capital up to three years tax exempt status. The world standard for oil companies, however, is to allow a period of seven to 10 years before expecting a profit. Nor was Amoco pleased that it was not exempt from the VAT [value-added tax] during the exploration period. While a June 1991 amendment to the law allowed companies formed under the 1988 law—including Amoco—to retain their tax exempt status as originally granted, a new condition was added at the beginning of this year, forfeiting the tax exempt status of any company formed under the 1988 law that had not yet begun economic activity nor had, by 31 March 1994, conducted its first commercial transaction. Forfeiture could be avoided if the company met at least two conditions: The contribution of the foreign party to the statutory capital had to exceed the equivalent of 2 million ECU's, and the company had to either a) undertake its activity in regions of high unemployment, b) ensure implementation of new technology, or c) sell at least 20 percent of its goods and services for export.

In accordance with the 1991 law, the tax relief cannot be higher than the value of the acquisition or the assumption of shares by the foreign entity. Thus, the exemption from income tax cannot be higher than the amount committed by the foreign entity to purchase the company's capital. RZECZPOSPOLITA notes that, on the basis of its information, there was no deviation from that principle. The entities now benefiting from tax exemptions either received them on the basis of the earlier 1988 law or have not exceeded in tax benefits the amount of their capital involvement.

Blaming the Government

The 15 May WPROST article viewed the Amoco situation less from an economic situation than from a political one, attributing it to a "three-part" ping-pong game between Amoco, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. While the ministers of finance in each of the governments since the agreement was signed acknowledged that demands for tax exempt status were valid and assured Amoco that "necessary decisions" were forthcoming, Amoco "continued

to wait." WPROST further placed some of the blame for Amoco's departure on the resignation of Finance Minister Marek Borowski (a member of the Democratic Left Alliance), quoting the Amoco director in Poland, Karl F. Arleth, as saying the day after Borowski's resignation that "we no longer felt welcome" in Poland. According to WPROST, Amoco "understood" that "all previously enacted settlements would no longer be respected" and quoted Arleth that the company never expected special tax consideration but only "to be treated in accordance with the rules of the oil business throughout the world." Indeed, WPROST reports that, while Amoco expected to "wait a while" for results, it later "warned" the Ministry of Environmental Protection that it had no intention of negotiating the conditions for the already signed contract "for eternity."

WPROST asserted that "directors of other companies have also expressed their disillusionment" and elsewhere notes that "today, British Gas, Exxon, and Shell have the same problems in Poland and are not advancing in their work." An unnamed "head of one of the oil comapnies represented in Poland" is quoted as saying that, in both Poland and Russia, "not much" has happened, "despite many contracts having been signed." "Everyone always wants more time," he said, but added that "after all, Poland simply does not have the number of deposits that Russia has." RZECZPOSPOLITA, in turn, notes that British Gas is currently drilling in the Lodz area and that "Exxon Shell" intends to drill in the area east of Poznan.

A General Downturn

In addition to the small deposits located in Poland thus far, RZECZPOSPOLITA offered a less politically involved reason for Amoco's departure: Last year, international oil suffered a "serious drop" in profits as a result of lower prices for crude oil. Citing FORTUNE magazine, it noted that oil companies around the world have dropped in the Fortune 500 list of major corporations, including Exxon, Elf Aquitaine, and the Spanish Repsol, which, RZECZPOSPOLITA noted, had also considered investing in Poland but decided against it. With Amoco dropping from 12th to 13th place in the list of leading oil companies, "it is very likely that, because there was little chance of making a big profit, Poland was simply crossed off the list."

Cooperation With Czechs, Slovaks in Arms Industry

LD0706203194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1447 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Warsaw, 7 Jun—A Czech and a Slovak delegation have been on a visit to Poland at the invitation of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The purpose of both visits is to resume cooperation between the arms industries of Poland and the Czech Republic [CR], and Poland and the Slovak Republic [SR], the ministry's press office announced today.

The Czech delegation, headed by Deputy Defense Minister Miroslav Kalousek, includes representatives of the Army and the arms industry, while, from Slovakia, only representatives of the arms industry have come to Poland.

As a PAP journalist learned unofficially, the Czechs are particularly interested in cooperation between the aviation industries. Both delegations will visit manufacturing plants including Unimor, Radwar, Bumar Labedy, Mesko in Skarzysko Kamienna, and Lucznik in Radom.

Izetbegovic, Delic Confer With Army Commanders

AU0706182994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the state presidency, and Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, met with the top commanders of the Supreme Command, comprising the chief of the General Staff, the commanders of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 7th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the commander of the Air Force and Air Defense at a command headquarters of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in central Bosnia today. They discussed and analyzed the military situation on the Bosnia-Herzegovina fronts, adopted appropriate decisions, and issued tasks for the period ahead.

Senior Humanitarian Aid Official To Be Tried

LD0706223694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] The main hearing at the trial of Dusko Tomic, secretary-general of the 1st Children's Embassy, will begin on 11 June, Bosnia-Herzegovina Press reports. It is suspected that Tomic has cooperated with the aggressor and he is considered the one most guilty for the inadequate organization of a convoy carrying food from Macedonia [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], which eventually ended up in the aggressor's hands in Pale.

Envoy to Switzerland on 'Greater Serbia' Plan

Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 15 May 94 pp 6-7

[Interview with Professor Dr. Muhamed Filipovic, Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Switzerland and deputy chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Academy of Sciences, by Luisa Ballin and Nefail Maliqi; place and date of interview not given: "The World Must Not Allow the Formation of Greater Serbia"]

[Excerpts] [FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT] We talked to Professor Dr. Muhamed Filipovic, author of 15 scientific and political works, deputy chairman of the Academy of Sciences of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and currently Bosnian ambassador in Bern, Switzerland, about the current situation in the former Yugoslav lands, especially about the two-year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the factor and role of the Albanian people in the Balkans, Yugoslav crimes and criminals, about Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], and about many other problems related to the former Yugoslavia. First of all, Ambassador, what is your view of the two-year interethnic conflict, or rather, what is your view of the current situation in the former Yugoslav lands, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Filipovic] I was actively involved in political life in the former Yugoslavia. I was also in the dissident opposition. During recent years, since 1967, I carefully monitored Bosnian life and life in the former Yugoslavia in general. I said in 1978 in Cavtat that Yugoslavia, such as it was, would have to collapse. I said this because I beleived that the communist system, which Yugoslavia had at that time, had completed its role in history. It was a system which put society into a dictatorial and totalitarian social system. So because of this, in my opinion, Yugoslavia no longer exists. The 1974 Constitution represented some views, but some peoples were unhappy with it; first of all the Albanians, who, although they enjoyed a certain autonomy, were discriminated against in all spheres of life. The pressure continues now and it is direct pressure.

When I talk to Albanians, I emphasize that I believe that the Bosnian Muslims are subject to the same situation, since, as you can see, they are permitted neither national nor religious emancipation. The aims of Serbia in regard to Bosnia are clearly seen here.

The situation with The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is another case. It takes the form of a controversy in regard to the autocephalous church of Macedonia but, in essence, it is a question of the nonrecognition of the people and the recognition of Macedonia as a some kind of state subject so that even today Macedonia is considered in actuality to be part of Serbia, a territory of southern Serbia.

Let us return to Bosnia. We know well from history that Bosnia-Herzegovina has existed for some time, like Albanians and Macedonians who have carried out a broad national emancipation, and that it once had its own state. But with the formation of Tito's Yugoslavia, the rise of nationalism began. The Serbs were the most aggressive in their nationalism, which the current situation proves. [passage omitted]

Much has been said about the fact that the Serbian aggressor appeared most fierce in Bosnia. People ask why. We know that Bosnia is the key to the existence or the nonexistence of "greater Serbia". Therefore, when the Serbs achieve victory in Bosnia, they will realize their age-old dreams. I think that they are very far away from this but that this is utopia for the Serbs.

Since the Serbs hate us as a people, they circulate propaganda inside and outside the area, saying that we are a primitive people, without culture and tradition and without a strong army. We should know the clear truth that the Bosnians and not the Turks controlled Bosnia for 300 years. No one can deceive us by saying that the Bosnian people have a weak army and do not have a combat tradition. The Serbs are victims of the propaganda line that says that the Turks defended Bosnia.

It is true that, during recent days of the war, the Serbs caused us great losses, more civilians than soldiers. As for our losses during the war, some 90 percent of those killed were civilians.

According to accurate information, about 56,000 Serbian soldiers have died in the Serbian-Muslim war while we Muslims have lost 12,800 soldiers. It is true that they have caused great losses, not only in lives but also in material goods. But this also means that this is the first time that the Serbian army is on the losing side. [passage omitted]

The war in Bosnia will last until the international community approves of and decides to create a "greater Serbia", a totalitarian state in which all non-Serbs or non-Slavs are subjected to such terror.

[FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT] Peace talks began a long time ago, along with the war in B-H, but who knows when this incomprehensible war will end.

[Filipovic] We can say that this peace process is one of the strangest processes in the world up to now. [passage omitted]

[FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT] In the European media and in international circles, there is talk about dividing Bosnia into three cantons. In your opinion, will Bosnia continue to be Bosnia-Herzegovina or will it be cantonized?

[Filipovic] Bosnia will continue to be the community of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But as of now, we still do not know what form this state will take. Bosnia will remain a state which did not begin its existence just now, but which has existed since the eighth century; it was the first Slavic state in this region. It had and has its own scientific continuity. It has more stable borders than any other state in the Balkans. [passage omitted]

I welcome the agreement with the Croats for the union of the two states. I think that this action by the two parties is very positive and that from now on all the Serbian teritories taken by force in Croatia and Bosnia will be considered to be terrotories occupied by Serbia. Then we will ask the Serbs if they want to keep fighting or if they want another solution.

[FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT] During an interview with S. [Suleyman] Uglanini [chairman of the Mulsim National Council of Sandzak] we were told, in response to a question, that if Bosnia is divided we would demand Sandjak [Sandzak] and unite it with our mother country. What is your comment on this?

[Filipovic] We consider that, historically, Sandjak is a territorial part of Bosnia. Certainly, earlier in its history Sandjak belonged to the vilayet of Bosnia and the Bosnian state of King Cerka. We are not in favor of changing the boundaries with the former Yugoslavia but I would like to say that the Bosnians should demand in Serbia everything that the Serbs are demanding in Bosnia.

Therefore, since the Serbs are demanding some kind of autonomy, a republic or whatever we call it, in Bosnia and Croatia, Sandjak should also receive full political autonomy with the right to unite with Bosnia. Thus, we are demanding reciprocity with Serbia. Thus, residents of Sandjak will have the same status in Serbia as Serbs will have in Bosnia. This is our policy.

[FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT] Recently some media organs and some circles have been saying that when the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is over, the Serbian aggressor will continue the conflict in Kosova [Kosovo] and Macedonia. Mr. Ambassador, what do you think about this?

[Filipovic] I do not think that there will be a war in Kosova. I say this because the Serbs will not be able to achieve their aims in Bosnia. But, if the war in Bosnia concludes in accordance with the Serbs' plans, then the torch of this war will extend not only to Kosova but also to Macedonia. Serbian plans against the Albanian people in Kosova did not begin in 1981, but earlier than that, with Cubrilovic, Andric, and Garashanin, and continued with the present-day new chetniks, such as Milosevic, Arkan, Seselj, and others who have always kept their eyes on Kosova for the purpose of plundering it and cleansing it of Albanians. What is happening now with the Bosnians, with more than 1 million Bosnians outside the country, immigrations which are the result of ethnic cleansing by Serbs in Bosnia so that they can integrate Bosnia with Serbia, as a part of Serbia—I am afraid will also happen with the Albanians in Kosova, where the Serbian regime has begun, by means of repression and provocations, to expel some of the Albanian population from their ethnic lands.

Thus, let me say once again that Bosnia-Herzegovina is the key to the existence or nonexistence of "Greater Serbia". Therefore, with the division of Bosnia, the chauvinistic Greater Serbian aims will be achieved and the conflict will be extended to other areas of the former Yugoslavia which are not involved in the war. However, I think that the Serbs are very far from achieving the age-old idea of a Greater Serbia and that such an idea is utopian.

[FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT] You have said that there are many war criminals in Switzerland. On what do you base your opinion?

[Filipovic] We have a list of 70 persons who are suspected of having committed war crimes and having taken part in criminal acts of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some of them have directly participated in massacres, ethnic cleansing, murders, rapes, looting, and the demolition and destruction of housing units. Another person served as a concentration camp guard. These people, who are suspected of being war criminals in the former Yugoslavia, many of whom have taken refuge in Switzerland, must be brought to justice. We have informed the appropriate organs of the Swiss Government about these cases. But that is not all. These

people are being trained, recruited, and mobilized here in Switzerland, voluntarily or against their will, to prepare for combat in Bosnia.

[FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT] How many dossiers have you compiled so far, what will you be doing about this in the future, and where are these individuals located?

[Filipovic] On our initiative, we have exposed persons who are currently living in different parts of Europe, such as Germany and Switzerland, especially in the German part of Switzerland, in places like Zug, Saint Gall, Basel, and Zurich. So far we have compiled 10 dossiers and, when the information is verified, we will hand them over to the federal organs in Switzerland. A number of Swiss lawyers have offered us assistance in pursuing these criminals because these suspects might leave Switzerland before they can be arrested.

[FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT] So far the United Nations secretary general has not named the prosecutor of the International Court who will be responsible for sentencing the war criminals of the former Yugoslavia. Do you think that the United Nations has the sentencing of war criminals in mind?

[Filipovic] In this direction, there is a lack of political will to fulfill the obligations resulting from United Nations conventions since 1948 and the resolutions approved by the Security Council in regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We have confidence that the organs of the countries in which the war criminals reside will pursue them and will react immediately because these states have all the legal elements for such a mission. However, it is disturbing that the International Court, at the initiative of the United Nations, is confronted with another serious problem: Will it be satisfied with the sentencing of small or low-level criminals, or should it also bring to justice those who truly deserve to be sentenced for ethnic cleansing, which is also considered to be a crime.

Slobodan Milosevic, Dobrica Cosic, Ratko Mladic, and Radovan Karadzic must be sentenced. They have the main responsibility for a policy which has used ethnic criteria to divide peoples who have always lived together.

[FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT] Does this mean that you are ready to demand than the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, be arrested and sentenced, where he lives or in Switzerland?

[Filopovic] I am presenting the example of Radovan Karadzic to you because he launched the idea of ethnic cleansing so that they could create a state on ethnic bases, an ethnically pure state, using an aggressive logic against a state which is recognized by the United Nations and other international circles. At the same time, this case is also an example to convince individuals and public opinion, in general, to use violence and to put ethnic cleansing into practice.

Serbian Attack on Northern Towns Reported

AU0806094494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 8 Jun 94

[Report by 3d Corps Press Center]

[Text] The chetniks were not calm on the battlefields in the area of the 3d Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina yesterday again. The most persistent attacks were in the free territories of Doboj and Tesanj, as well as at our defense positions that the chetnik artillery had fiercely turned on. There was no peace on the other battlefields either. The increasingly frequent movements by motor vehicles, the bringing in of new forces, and the enemy's regrouping are a sign of the intensification of the offensive. The chetnik artillery pounded Doboj-Tesanj villages and defense lines all the time yesterday. A howitzer at Stanovi pounded Putesici and Kalosevici, tanks at Sinanovici Guvno and Brze Grane pounded Zmajevac, and a Bofors gun at Siljato Brdo was firing on Peliva. A chetnik Bofors gun was active at Plane and a B-1 gun from (Tomic) Brdo kept destroying Kriz.

In the meantime, four buses full of chetniks arrived at the Stankova Kosa-Ambariste-Strizijevica line. Chetnik artillery occasionally fired at Zavidovici battlefields. Mortar activity was registered at Hajderovici. Much more than that, they used infantry and antiaircraft weapons to shoot at our defenders positions. More than 20 trucks and other motor vehicles have arrived in the Zavidovici region. The replacement of forces, bringing new ones, and the regrouping accompanied by armored transporters along the Lukici-Sjenokos and Podsjelovo-Stog lines are a sign of new chetnik strikes. Infantry, antiaircraft, and mortar fire, particularly at Privije and Stolac Brdo, marked the day yesterday in the Seric-Teslic region.

Therefore, there is not as much as one day of the chetniks' cease-fire on the 3d Corps battlefields.

Muslims Reportedly Shell Doboj Area 7 Jun

LD0706214994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2050 GMT 7 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Doboj, June 7 (TANJUG)—A woman was killed and her daughter wounded in the Serb village of Puracic near Doboj in northern Bosnia in the renewed Moslem shelling of the Doboj area on Tuesday morning [7 June], Bosnian Serb military sources report. The intensive shelling of Doboj in the past two months has left 20 civilians dead, five of them children, and more than 60 wounded. The shelling is a prelude to an all-out Moslem attack on that Serb town, which has been openly stated by the Moslem commanders, with the aim of cutting the vital corridor along the Sava river which links the western and eastern parts of the Bosnian Serb republic.

The Bosnian Serb army on Tuesday repelled three heavy combined artillery-infantry attacks by the Moslems on Mt. Ozren in northern Bosnia. The Moslem attack was backed by U.N. Leopard tanks, Bosnian Serb military sources say. On April 30 in the region of Moslem-held Tuzla in northeastern Bosnia, Nordic U.N. troops for the first time backed a Moslem ground attack on Serb positions which left nine Serb soldiers dead and five wounded. The Bosnian Serb army says that the Moslems have also been attacking Serb villages in the Mt. Ozren area.

In the area of Teslic, Bosnian Serb troops have neutralized a Moslem commando team, it adds. The Moslems are launching a major offensive on the Bosnian Serb republic while their leaders are negotiating a general cessation of hostilities in Geneva.

Sarajevo Radio Reports Serbs Still in Gorazde

AU0706154994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Report by Enes Musovic from Gorazde]

[Excerpt] The 3-km exclusion zone from the center of Gorazde has still not been cleared of chetniks. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] neither wants nor has the means to implement the NATO ultimatum or UN Security Council Resolution 913. At approximately 1800 last night, one fighter of the Bosnian Army was seriously wounded in the head inside the 3-km zone. He was fired at from the direction of (?Sjenokosa). He was in a position that could have only been fired on from inside the exclusion zone. UNPROFOR is allowing the Serbs that are not carrying any arms to freely enter the suburbs of Fazlagici, (?Huljderi), and Zubcici to loot what is still left in these settlements. Some 90 Serbs came to (?Huljderi) yesterday. They looted houses and loaded everything on tractors. After that, they freely passed by the blue helmets. [passage omitted]

Sarajevo Radio: Serbs Shelling Gradacac

AU0706153694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Report by unidentified correspondent]

[Text] The situation in the Gradacac region was reported to be particularly grave this morning.

[Correspondent] Tank, howitzer, and mortar projectiles are landing on the central part of the town, the industrial zone, suburbs, and the surrounding villages. The most active aggressor's stronghold is most certainly that on Gornje Krecane, from where the aggressor is firing all types of weapons, including hill guns. They are targeting Rajska and Lukavac. The greatest number of projectiles has landed on civilian houses, which were also subjected to the fiercest barrage fire. The aggressor is thought to have fired more than 400 shells. According to the latest report, three persons were wounded. This morning, Gradacac was subjected to the brutal and wild chetnik artillery attacks, which were witnessed by the representatives of the international forces.

Serbs, Abdic Supporters Reportedly Attacking Bihac

AU0806115394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 8 Jun 94

[Text] Here is Mirza Sadikovic reporting on the continuation of the attacks by the joint aggressors in the Bihac region:

[Begin recording] [Bosnian Serb leader Radovan] Karadzic's chetniks carried out provocations with infantry weaponry and antiaircraft weapons along all lines in the zone covered by the [Bosnian Army's] 5th Corps, and particularly in the Bosanska Krupa section of the front. Members of [self-proclaimed leader of autonomous province of western Bosnia Fikret] Abdic's treacherous paramilitary were in action with antiaircraft weapons and heavy machine-guns along all lines of separation throughout the night and this morning. They indiscriminately shelled (?civilian) villages in the [word indistinct] regions of (Strbac), Pecigrad, (Lickovac), and (Skodrovo). Shots and bomb explosions could be heard throughout the night on the (Strbac)-(?Sturlic) line, which clearly shows that what is involved are new clashes between Fikret Abdic's mercenaries and (?renegades) with the local population, which no longer accepts the [words indistinct] conflict imposed on it. [end recording]

Bihac Situation 'Real Chaos'

LD0706175494 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] We have heard what the situation is like in Tuzla; now let us see what is happening in Bihac. The increasing resistance to fundamentalist policy and demands of the 5th Corps for offensive actions are causing a mutual settling of scores between individual armed groups. It has been learned that the greatest number of clashes, killings, and the burning and destruction of houses is being directed against progressive Muslims, who are advocating a cease-fire with [self-proclaimed leader of autonomous province of western Bosnia] Fikret Abdic.

Well-informed sources have learned that in Bihac there is real chaos. Anarchy and criminals are everywhere, and war profiteers are taking up key positions of authority. Refugees from Prijedor, Novi, and Krupa are refusing to take further part in the fighting because their commanders are pushing them to take up the hottest positions, while locals are engaged on secondary tasks or are exempt from military service.

In keeping with orders from Sarajevo, the command of the Fifth Corps is preparing an offensive against Serbian-held areas. As a result, the inhabitants of the villages of Sturlic, Nisici, and Hale have already been evacuated.

However, problems in connection with certain tasks have caused clashes within the command of the 5th Corps, and as a result several officers have been dismissed. All these problems and clashes are continuing with undiminished intensity and are causing a very difficult and uncertain situation in the Cazin region.

Report Assesses Strength of Bosnian Army

AU0706143594 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 27 May 94 pp 7-9

[Report by Vladimir Jovanovic, Dusko Vujadinovic, Goran Sinadjinovic, and Pedja Bozovic: "The Comeback of Write-offs"]

[Text] The latest military successes of the Bosnian troops on many fronts, particularly Mount Majevica, and the final subordination of the Croatian brigades under the command of the central authority in Sarajevo, speaks more and more for the likelihood that the war will be settled by operations in the field. The agencies are reporting the formation of the joint General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina [BH Army], headed by Generals Fikret Muslimovic and Ante Roso. This is, in fact, the result of the mission by U.S. General John Galvin, who organized and directed many meetings between the Bosnian and the Croatian generals.

It seems that at the strategic level the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] still has some autonomy: the chief of HVO General Staff, General Milivoje Petkovic, said recently in Mostar that the HVO units positioned near Orasje would be receiving his orders in the case of clashes in Bosanska Posavina [Sava River basin], but also that the 107th and 108th HVO brigade, which are located in the area of responsibility of the 2d Corps of the BH Army are under the direct command of the Bosnian officers. The tension is easing in Mostar, while the occasional incidents between the Bosnian and Croatian forces no longer have serious consequences. It is believed that the Croatian seaports, in particular Split and Ploce, are gradually opening for arms imports, which are accumulating on the Tuzla front, near the northern corridor. What do the troops of the Bosnian new federal army have at their disposal at the moment?

Ethnic Diversity

The "old" Bosnian army (without the HVO) had some 70,000 to 80,000 effective soldiers (meaning well-armed), and more than 100,000 men in reserve forces. They are organized in six corps and two independent brigades, which are organized according to operational zones. The (JANE'S) SENTINEL agency believes that the Bosnians have 85 tanks and around 100 large caliber cannons, while there are also, as MONITOR found out, at least 14 helicopters concentrated in the regions of Zenica (because of clashes on Mount Vlasic) and Tuzla (see box).

The Bosnian Army's forces are ethnically diverse, and correspond to the national makeup of the territory controlled by the central government. At least 10 percent of the Bosnian Army are Serbs. There is only one unit composed exclusively of Muslim soldiers, namely the 7th brigade, which involves volunteers to a certain degree as well.

The HVO is organized according to the territorial principle. The arrangement is according to operational zones, and one such zone is made up of six to eight brigades. In the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina the HVO has some 45,000 soldiers (making up a total of 22 brigades), five independent regiments, two armored motorized platoons, and one special unit with 1,000 diversionists.

One HVO brigade has around 1,800 people (that number used to vary from 500 to 2,500), while each of the brigades contains the command post, three infantry battalions, and one military police platoon.

The regiments number around 1,000 fighters. In western Herzegovina and the Neretva basin there are 20,000 HVO soldiers, in northern Bosnia there are around 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers, 6,000 to 8,000 soldiers in central Bosnia, some 2,000 soldiers in the region of Sarajevo, as much in Bihac, and a quite insignificant number in the enclaves of eastern Bosnia.

The Croatian forces in central Bosnia are organized within the 5th operational zone, while in northern Bosnia the 102d, 103d, 105th, 107th, 108th, 115th, and 139th brigades are deployed within the 4th operational zone. According to Western assessments, the HVO has at its disposal 105 tanks (mostly T-54 and T-55), while as for rocket launchers, it has RPG-7, Maljutka, Zolja, Osa, and Ambrust types. Of the multi-stage rocket launchers, the HVO has Oganj and Plamen (128 millimeters), and the manual BM-21. As for cannons these are mostly 76 millimeter caliber, and 105 millimeter howitzers.

The controversy over a plane loaded with explosives and (perhaps) ammunition at Zagreb airport—it was supposed to strengthen the war logistics of the Bosnians—is not of much significance, and is probably aimed at achieving propaganda goals. The explosives factory in Vitez—now controlled by the HVO—is merging with the Bratstvo factory in Novi Travnik (which was attacked by Serbian Galebs [seagulls] on 28 February), which produces rockets, cannons and howitzers, as well as with the rocket fuel factory in Bugojno and the lightweight infantry weapons factory in Konjic.

Serbian military sources believe that at the moment the Bosnians most need tanks and armored vehicles (which is logical, in view of their offensive character), and claim that there is a plan for such equipment to be transported by C-5 Galaxy and C-141 Star-Lifter heavy transport planes either to Sarajevo Airport or Tuzla Airport.

Generals and Politicians

Who are the commanders of the new Bosnian federal army? General Colonel Ante Roso started his military

career in the French Foreign Legion, where he worked his way up to the rank of colonel and commander of the 2d parachute brigade. At the beginning of the war in Croatia he commanded the ZNG [People's Guard's Corps] units in Slavonia, and organized the Croatian guard brigade in Vukovar. He was commander of the Croatian special units (Zrinjski and Frankopan units), after which he went to Bosnia, where he became chief of the HVO Staff.

Later he gave up that post to General Milivoj Petkovic (then commander of the 113th HVO brigade). Thereafter General Roso was relocated to the command area of Split, where, together with Generals Janko Bobetko and Zeljko Tomljenovic of the Croatian Interior Ministry, he organized the raid on the Serbian position around Maslenica bridge in January last year. After that he returned to Bosnia, and took over the post of commander in chief of the HVO Staff from General Slobodan Praljak.

General Fikret Muslimovic is a former officer of the Yugoslav People's Army, who—at his own request—was demobilized early in 1992, but the circumstances remain unclear. On the eve of the war he was selling books in Bas-Carsija [Sarajevo old town]. Some claim it was a gesture of his determination, while others say it was just a camouflage covering the fact that he was a KOS [Counterintelligence Service] officer. As a matter of fact, General Muslimovic was the head of the security service of the then Sarajevo Corps, although he actually graduated from the Military Academy, which is to say, his qualifications are those of a "combat" officer.

In the BH Army he was chief of the military secret police. Many people believe he was involved in the affair regarding the removal of the former commander of the BH Army, namely General Sefer Halilovic, but this has never been officially confirmed. He enjoys President Izetbegovic's support, whereas to a lesser extent that of Haris Silajdzic's. Some people with whom MONITOR spoke believe that by his appointment as chief of the BH Army Izetbegovic is trying to strengthen his control over the military structure, because so far the top officers have always been more devoted to Silajdzic.

Strategic Direction

General Tudjman [Croatian president] stated on Saturday that Croatia had no intention of extending the mandate to the blue helmets in the UN protection areas, which expires in September. The matter is probably that the revival of military efforts aimed at placing Krajina under the Croatian control is being prepared. An introduction into this is probably a possible escalation of the war in Bosnia, particularly the battle for the strategic jugular—the northern Serbian corridor.

From the point of view of the Bosnian military forces, Izetbegovic's statement about an acceptable truce lasting two, rather than four months, sounds logical, since the estimates about the time needed for the consolidation of the Bosnian and the Croatian forces to be completed largely correspond to his demand. Still, it is believed that the task of organizing joint units that is awaiting the two sides, will be very difficult, since the existing forces do not meet the conditions necessary for the formation of relatively strong armored battalions—which are indispensable for offensive operations. In addition, the lack of larger mechanized infantry units capable of providing adequate support to tank units while operating in lowlands and uplands around the northern corridor (from Semberija to Doboj) is very conspicuous.

The Serbian military circles are convinced that the basic strategic direction of the latest activities of the Bosnian forces is—Brcko. This attitude is disclosed by several statements made by people in the Serbian military and political leadership. The Serbs have piled up an enormous force on the 60-kilometer wide front to the south of the Sava, in the wider area of Brcko, but except for several artillery attacks by the BH Army, there has not been any real raid on Brcko. Our estimates say that such a raid will hardly happen, because the Bosnians are hardly capable of holding Brcko, if the fighting for the northern corridor happens to be concentrated on Brcko only.

The Bosnians have tied the Serbian forces to the Brcko front, and thus forced them to stretch their lines. The Bosnian forces are keeping up pressure on other fronts, while through their linear disposition of troops, their activities are still not disclosing the point of a key attack. As a matter of fact, this attack will hardly happen, if the Croats fail to guarantee that they will bring in the mass artillery support from the left bank of the Sava. However, this would involve the risk of possible revival of clashes in Krajina, to which a possible introduction may be the recent interruption of the negotiating process between Zagreb and Knin and Belgrade.

Nevertheless, it seems that the clashes going on at Mount Majevica at the moment have perhaps the greatest importance: U.S. reconnaissance planes have discovered a strengthened accumulation of Serbian artillery on the mountain. The news agencies claim that the commander of the European military sector south, NATO Admiral Layton Smith, has sought UNPROFOR's permission to attack the Serbian positions.

The entire matter is still so confusing, particularly because of the undefined position of the blue helmets in Bosnia, as well as the announcement of their possible withdrawal. Still, it is unlikely that the withdrawal will come about. The crisis regarding the issue has probably been caused by the confusing attitudes of the U.S. Administration. The announced partition of Bosnia in the form of a tripartite union does not sound acceptable either to the Bosnian side, or to the Serbian side, and that situation could possibly be resolved by an eventual military defeat of one of the rival armies.

Tudjman Warns of Italian Neofascist Claims

LD0706154094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Excerpt] Top-level Slovene-Croat talks have been held in the Presidential Palace in Zagreb. The presidents of the two countries, Franjo Tudjman and his guest Milan Kucan, who arrived this morning for a working visit to Croatia, made brief statements following their talks. The Slovene president's visit to Zagreb is being covered by Andjelko Perincic:

[Perincic] Speaking to the press, President Kucan described the talks as tough, polemic, and open but imbued with mutual understanding nevertheless.

[Begin Kucan recording, in Slovene with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I believe, as the talks demonstrated, that unilateral solutions do not facilitate mutual understanding and the development of mutual trust between the two countries. The talks were held under different circumstances from those surrounding the process of securing Slovene and Croatian independence when there were intense contacts. [end recording]

Kucan also said life demands solutions to problems and the establishment of new political relations can be endorsed only by concrete steps. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman also spoke to the press.

[Begin Tudjman recording] Many international factors prompt both Croatia and Slovenia to coordinate their policies. The rise of neofascist claims in today's Italy against Slovene and Croatian territory explicitly point to this. Understandably, we hope the Italian Government will continue the democratic policies pursued by the previous governments and the policy of friendly relations with our countries. At the same time we must not ignore those forces that are openly extolling fascism, including everything this fascism brought about on the soil of Slovenia and Croatia. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Kucan Describes Talks

AU0706155294 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] President Milan Kucan talked to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in the presidential residence in Zagreb this morning for more than two hours. Slovene Foreign Ministry adviser Ida Mocilnik and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic also participated in the talks. Let us listen to a report by Nadja Pengov:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] We established that the relations have been stagnating for a long period of time, President Kucan said in a statement for the public, and we had to ask ourselves whether this was in the vital interest of Slovenia and Croatia:

[Kucan] We have established that this is not in our interest and does not suit the vital interests of any of the countries, and that we must thus find solutions, even if they prove to be demanding and difficult ones. Our discussion was very frank, fierce, and in some points also very hard, which means that these problems cannot be solved by silence, without a constant dialogue and capability for dialogue.

[Pengov] We are convinced, President Kucan continued, that such an assessment will also be adopted by the incumbent offices of our states and agreed that unilateral and imposed solutions do not contribute toward the deepening of trust between the two countries.

The international community also does not want members who cannot negotiate. Some international circumstances have changed, Kucan continued, while we have been receiving discouraging news from our western neighbor [Italy]. Also:

[Kucan] Mr. President and I both concluded—which makes me particularly happy—that our statements and conclusions about the need for good relations alone are not sufficient if they are not followed up by concrete actions.

[Pengov] Now to Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman. There is a high degree of consensus in the views on essential issues despite open questions. There are no such problems in the relations between the countries that could not be resolved.

[Tudjman, in Croatian fading into Slovenian translation] Numerous reasons exist for our governments to accelerate the resolution of open and controversial problems, President Tudjman said and especially emphasized the importance of refraining from exaggeration of problems in the public. He spoke in favor of the relations that will help both sides.

In his statement he also warned of the neo-Fascists appetites for the Slovene and Croatian territories, even though he expressed hope that the new Italian Government will pursue its old policy in its relations with neighbors. He also warned of some tendencies for the formation of a sort of new Yugoslavia.

Regarding the relations between the countries, he said the following: There are no territorial demands, he said. The issue of Trdinov Vrh [Sveta Gera], Piran Bay, and the Phyrn highway [Sentilj-Zagreb] need to be resolved as quickly as possible. The economic relations must be developed on the basis of a deeper cooperation and we are interested in taking a joint path toward European integration, he said. [end recording]

Krajina Leaders To Hold Talks With Croatia

LD0706192994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1739 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Geneva, 7 Jun (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina President Krajina Milan Martic today told the TANJUG reporter in Geneva that negotiations on economic issues between Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina would be held on 16 and 17 June in Plitvice.

This has been agreed with the Croatian side, Martic said. This afternoon he talked in the Palace of Nations with special UN envoy Yasushi Akashi and cochairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Owen and Stoltenberg. Martic said that in Plitvice, talks will take place on economic issues regardless of the unresolved political problems with Croatia. He confirmed that there was full solidarity between the people of the republic of Serb Krajina and their brethren in the republic of Srpska and added that the Sava corridor was of vital importance to them. The president of the republic of Serb Krajina also said that his delegation might talk to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali tomorrow in the Palace of Nations in Geneva.

At a later news conference, Owen and Stoltenberg described today's talks as a small step in the right direction and added that the next round of talks with the leaders of the republic of Serb Krajina would take place on 30 June. They did not specify the site or the agenda.

Krajina Leader on Talks

LD0706222094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2205 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Knin, June 7 (TANJUG)—Prime minister of the republic of Serb Krajina Borislav Mikelic on Tuesday [7 June] assessed as positive the talks with a United States (U.S.) non-government delegation and said he was confident that its members would leave with quite different opinions about the Serb people of Krajina than they had as a result of the anti-Serb proganda abroad before their arrival. Mikelic met with the U.S. delegation in Krajina's political center of Knin on Tuesday. The delegation included many prominent former U.S. ambassadors to the United Nations, influential diplomats and representatives of the U.S. mass media, headed by the editor-in-chief of Time magazine.

Mikelic and national security advisor to the Krajina president General Mile Novakovic informed the visitors about the current political situation in Serb-Croat relations and about the genesis of the armed conflicts in the territory of former Yugoslavia. The purpose of this visit was to review the realization of the ceasefire agreement with Croatia and the withdrawal of forces, and the conditions, efficiency and type of work done by the members of the United Nations peace force in the field.

The republic of Serb Krajina was formed in 1991 in Serb-populated parts of former Croatia in answer to Croatia's secession from former Yugoslavia and attempts to reduce the Serb people to a national minority. Since March 1992, Krajina has been a U.N.-protected area, which however, did not prevent Croatia from attacking the area on four occasions, razing some twenty Serb villages and killing more than a thousand civilians.

The agreement on a ceasefire and separation of forces, which was signed by Krajina and Croatia at the Russian Embassy in Zagreb in late March, became effective on April 4.

U.S. President's Special Envoy Arrives

LD0706165694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1113 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] Ohrid, 7 Jun (TANJUG)—Matthew Nimetz, special envoy of the U.S. President in the Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]-Greece dispute, arrived on a two-day working visit to Macedonia today to hold talks in connection with the resumption of the New York negotiations between Athens and Skopje on 13 June. Nimetz, who arrived from Athens, was welcomed at Ohrid's Podmolje airport by FYROM Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and Ivan Tosevski, an official of this ministry. Nemitz and Crvenkovski immediately started talks in Ohrid. The U.S. envoy will be received in Skopje tomorrow by FYROM President Kiro Gligorov.

Albanian Parties Want Postponement of Census

AU0706194594 Skopje MIC in English 7 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Albanian Parties Requesting Postponement of Census"]

[Text] In order to provide an objective and realistic implementation of the census, the government is asked, provided it assesses that there are objective difficulties in meeting the legal conditions, to undertake an urgent initiative for changing and supplementing the Census Law by prolonging the term set for the census. This was jointly requested by all Albanian political parties and movements in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

At their recent meeting, it was concluded that the representatives of the Albanian political parties address the president of the republic, the government, the state commission, as well as the expert group determined by the European Council to monitor the census, with the stance that a successful implementation of the census cannot be expected if all defects are not eradicated from the beginning to the end.

In the announcement issued from the meeting of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], the NDP [People's Democratic Party], and the ADS-Liberal Party (Albanian Democratic Alliance-Liberal Party) it is concluded that a range of important conditions for the implementation of the legal provisions are not being realized at all, while the census deadline is approaching. It was also assessed that a great part of the population has still not obtained its personal documentation necessary for the census.

The Albanian parties also believe that the public competitions for census takers and instructors are also being announced and organized with a delay and inappropriately, whereby, contrary to the legal provisions, they do not comply with the proportional principle of representation, according to the structure of the population.

The agreement for appropriate hiring of expert personnel at the Republican Bureau for Statistics from the ranks of the Albanian population, as an important condition for the fulfilling of its true function, is not being realized to any extent. The question regarding the interpretation of Article 30 of the Census Law in regions where the population is not mixed, is once again raised. It is believed that it is unnatural for a census taker, a Macedonian, to unconditionally take part in such mixed regions, while for pure Macedonian regions the census takers to be exclusively Macedonians.

Commentary Sees Rising Tensions in Region

AU0706143294 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 3 Jun 94 p 6

[Commentary by Mirka Velinovska: "A Finger in the Hole in the Dam Wall"]

[Text] Although official Athens impressively insists that the "change in the attitude of the United States toward Greece on a range of questions of great importance for Greek interests" must not be correlated with the visit of [Greek Foreign Affairs] Minister Karolos Papulias to Moscow, it was not difficult, nevertheless, for analysts of Balkan politics to predict the timing of the visit, even the meeting itself. Namely, over half a year ago, Greece marked its reserve trump card with which it "threatened" its European and U.S. partners in the political poker game that it would start bargaining if it is left in the lurch. Now Greece wants to decrease the supposed suspicion in its intentions by emphasizing that the "relations with the European Union and the United States are still of greater priority compared to the relations with Russia," on the one side, and that there is a "much greater space for enhancing its relations with Moscow, which should not distress Washington," on the other.

One of the points of approach has been the repeated thesis of the threat or "attack against Orthodoxy and Hellenism from coordinated Turkish action through Skopje and Tirana, with some unidentified non-Balkan forces"—as Greek Prime Minister Papandreou said. It is exactly in that light that we must observe Greece's chairing of the European Union last month and the expectations of the Athenian political circles that Russia, through its cooperation with Greece, may, in the future, contribute to the solution of some disputes in the southern Balkans—explicitly noting Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Albania, as well as that, in future, a greater contribution from the Russian diplomacy is expected in the dispute between Greece and Turkey. Of course, this will be of special importance if it comes out as a serious part of the Greek Prime Minister's statement that the "problem with the name [of FYROM] will be ultimately left to the Security Council." Nevertheless, I take the liberty of having certain reserves regarding such an outcome. At least not in the form in which the Security Council can agree to change the name of a state with a resolution,

particularly because two of its members (Russia is the one) have recognized our country by its constitutional name. The second matter on which we should have reservations is the fact that the Security Council resolutions are mainly not implemented and accepted by the country they are dedicated to.

One would say that everything is in its place and in conformity with Papandreou's policy, who obviously doubts the promptness of Washington in meeting his wish—in the dispute with Macedonia—and making him a national hero and a diplomatic winner. Evidently, the formula of Clinton's policy—without winners or losers in Balkan disputes, is not a result desired by the old Greek fox, and therefore he reaches for his reserve card.

After the two controversial statements of the Greek prime minister, one after the other, given in the course of only 24 hours, and related to the "Macedonian case," the current dispute has hardly become more clear. Nevertheless, while we are expecting [U.S. presidential envoy] Matthew Nimetz's visit to Skopje and Athens, and the new round of [FYROM Foreign Minister] Stevo Crvenkovski's discussions in New York, we are able to make assumptions founded on the known information:

1. Papandreou's statements, repeated several times, that he "will never recognize a state with the name of Macedonia," and that the "dispute is practically on the eve of a solution," only seem to be contradictory. We can suppose, for instance, that Greece will accept the Irish formula for the solution of the dispute, which will provide Papandreou and his government with an alibi for the Greek domestic public—that he really did not accept a state with the name of Macedonia. In all this, the rest of the world will be left aside.

2. If we talk about finesses, we should then examine the tension in relations with Albania in that light. The sharp turns and stresses of the Albanian-Greek political dispute in the last two weeks can be interpreted in the light of the known Serbian formula: Close a problem, open another with the aim of distracting the attention of the people. Actually, following the seasoned Greek formula for conducting a national policy, this case is also being followed in meetings in Salonika, this time against Albania. The people have been allotted a new cut-off time, and Papandreu has been left with some breathing space.

3. The situation with Albania was strained just after the shock the north [FRY] and south [Greece] neighbors had after the informal meeting between [FYROM President Kiro] Gligorov and [Albanian President Sali] Berisha in Podgradec [Albania] and Ohrid [FYROM]. Therefore, the easing of relations with one country causes tensions with those following the other plan, particularly because strategies and practical political steps founded on false theses have been abandoned. Moreover, if Sali Berisha remains consistent in his claim that the Kosovo problem will be solved pragmatically—that is that the Albanian president has accepted the existing borders with Serbia—it will be difficult for Greece to accept that relaxation in the southern Balkans and rejoice in it openly.

4. Meanwhile, following the Greek political pulse and the same timing, Serbia has also strained relations with Macedonia in the past few weeks. We have already commented on the statements of Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic regarding the recognition of Macedonia by Serbia and Montenegro, which are continually becoming more radicalized. Now comes the time for warnings from the Serbian army for the transfer of some watchtowers on the Macedonian-Serbian border or.... The timing has been set, and the threatening "or" will be enforced when the census in our country begins.

It seems that, in a range of consequentially linked reactions in the Balkans (including the reinforced Bulgarian campaign for proving the Bulgarian character of Macedonia, as well as of those "realists" who accept the "existence of Macedonianness as armor for the protection from alienation, but not the Macedonian national recognition") the key position is occupied by the census that has to begin in a few days. This event, always and everywhere considered to be an ordinary and necessary statistical operation, except in this region—particularly in Macedonia—is becoming a primary event for many known and often elaborated reasons.

[Text] That is why the state was expected to play a more active role in this act. If a party is calling on the Macedonian people to boycott the census and protest, if the operation depends on "how the wolf will count the sheep," if the editorial houses have received information that the political parties in Western Macedonia are making propaganda and pressuring the Macedonians to declare themselves as Serbs, if large groups of retired and active Serbian officers have, just now, chosen to come to our country for recreation and on week-ends, it does not look too good and it should be succeeded by a more serious process.

One must bear in mind the assessment of Defense Minister Vlado Popovski, transmitted by REUTER, that the increased activity on the Serbian-Macedonian border, and similar activity that is also to be expected in the south, certainly toward Albania, can be understood as open pressure and threats. Nevertheless, it can also be taken as a danger sign, indicating how the political leaderships of friendly Serbia and Greece view the solution of problems in the southern Balkans. That is exactly why it is necessary to follow the growing tensions with the neighbors and the reverberations that will certainly be felt in our domestic political life in the next two weeks.

Joint Scientific Projects With Albania

AU0706154094 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 1 Jun 94 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Cooperation Through Joint Scientific Projects"]

[Text] Branko Crvenkovski, prime minister for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FRYOM], yesterday received an Albanian Government delegation headed by the president of the Committee for Science and Technology, Maxim Konomi.

The meeting emphasized the satisfaction with the action taken to promote cooperation between the two countries through the Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation that will be signed by Macedonian Science Minister Aslan Selmani and Konomi.

It was concluded that this agreement was very important for promoting cooperation in the area of science as a basis for cooperation in more important areas of mutual interest for the two countries. The possibilities for cooperation envisaged in the agreement open the road to bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the two states, as well as cooperation among the countries in the Balkans, Europe, and the world. Regional scientific projects are the main projects for which financing is envisaged by the European Union and the United Nations, above all traffic, economic, energy, information, and ecology programs.

Yesterday, the Albanian delegation also had a meeting with the president of the Macedonian Academy of Science and Arts, Ksente Bogoev. Interest in cooperation between the two academies was expressed, as well as general readiness to organize a meeting of the delegations of the academies in Skopje and Tirana. Cooperation can be also implemented by organizing a scientific symposium on the ecological protection of Lake Ohrid, which is of great significance for both countries.

Frederika Popovska-Pavlovska, vice president of St. Cyril and Methodius University and responsible for international cooperation, informed the guests from Albania about the organization in our universities. She expressed interest in cooperation at university level, and also at the level of particular faculties and scientific institutions, which will enable cooperation on the level of teaching and scientific personnel through joint scientific projects. Interest was also expressed in including the two countries in the TEMPUS and KOPERNIKUS programs, which invoive cooperation among higher educational institutions.

President Kucan on Relations With Croatia

LD0706220494 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1840 GMT 6 Jun 94

[Interview with Slovene President Milan Kucan by unidentified correspondent; date and place not given; Kucan speaks in Slovene with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] Mr. President, your visit to Croatia and your talks with President Tudjman are taking place at a time when Croatian-Slovene relations have been assuming more positive forms. Can you compare the state of relations between the two countries at a time of their struggle for independence, and today when these relations are not as idyllic as they used to be four years ago?

[Kucan] I cannot see much improvement in our relations. They are simply stagnating. This is a bad thing and does not reflect the fact that we are two countries. It does not reflect our interests and is far below the level of both countries' vital interests. It is true, as you say, that our relations had a far more glittering past, which was more beneficial to both countries. This was at the time of dissociation and our nascent independence when the two countries set their standards of international conduct. These standards were based on the realization that a peaceful way was needed, that arguments were needed, as well as respect for others, that dialogue was needed. All of this facilitates coexistence once it has been established that living together in a shared state is no longer possible. At that time, by these standards, both countries established their recognizable individuality in international relations. They managed to prove the fundamental validity of their decision to exercise their right to self-determination. It is then justifiable to ask: Why are they not capable now of meeting these same standards in their mutual relations? Why has their will decreased? Why do they not find the resolution of these issues a priority? Why do they rather find priorities elsewhere? To some extent we can justify and understand this as a result of the different circumstances surrounding Slovenia, as opposed to those surrounding Croatia. Given both countries' ambitions, I am referring to their European ambitions. It is nevertheless a short-sighted view that the issue of mutual relations are not a priority. Countries that are incapable of resolving their shared issues along European criteria—without creating difficulties for others and without shifting their responsibility to others—will not be welcomed by the family of European nations.

Among other things, this demonstrates the need to establish first, whether there is a political will to really start resolving these problems. In other words, this is not a matter of parading a nonexistent idyll which is of no use to anyone, but the realization of the true gravity and importance of these problems, which must be geared to resolving conditions along the border. This is something which directly affects peoples' lives.

In this context, the economic sphere must also be mentioned, as it directly affects the quality of life in both countries. My principal task during my visit to Zagreb is to find out whether there is such a will on the part of Croatia, something that, in my view, is impossible to do without talking to Mr. Tudjman.

[Correspondent] I will mention some outstanding issues: the state border, the Ljubljanska Bank, Krsko nuclear power plant, property relations. In your view, how much are these issues an expression of the real state of affairs, and how much is there a need for both countries to confirm their internationally recognized independence on these issues?

[Kucan] Unfortunately, the reality does not allow a strict separation of internal and foreign policies. One is in the service of the other. Each democratic and wise policy has to take into consideration not only the affirmation of the state in the first place, but also whether it is able to organize life in the state in a bearable way, and whether it is able to organize it in such a way that it does not infringe on the equal rights of other states and other nations.

The problems that you have just mentioned have been inherited from our life in the former Yugoslav state. In part we are able to resolve them through bilateral talks and negotiations; in part they need to be settled, for principled reasons, within the framework of the succession of the former common state. We should not forget that part of the succession issue is in connection with other states that have been created, or are being created, on the territory of former Yugoslavia. I would not set them out as a condition, that only after these issues have been resolved—even though I am not underestimating their seriousness—it would be possible to resolve other issues.

The biggest difficulty for Croatia and Slovenia is the decline in economic cooperation. As regards Slovene exports, Croatia is the third economic partner, and as regards imports it is in fourth place, and is declining. Unfortunately, this trend is continuing this year. We can partially justify it with the fact that Croatia lives somewhat according to the logic of a war economy. However, that is not the right answer. Property issues have not been settled, in addition to a series of other things, which in the long run—at a time when the situation in the Balkans went this way—are falling to a completely different level of economic exchange [as heard]. This huge decline does not just represent a decline in quantity, but also a decline in the quality of relations.

Slovenia has concluded agreements on free trade with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and an agreement with Poland is being prepared, and as regards the option of concluding such an agreement with Austria—given its specific nature because of Austria's admission soon into the European Union—we are thinking about Austria and Croatia. We have only signed a declaration on reaching such an agreement. This is not to mention

those that need to be signed, such as the avoidance of double taxation, an agreement on securing investments, which would show good will and an understanding of how much our economies are linked. But for the time being we have not talked about it. [passage omitted]

The problems of transition are very complex. Everyone is solving them in line with their specific conditions; what everyone has achieved as regards long-term and wise results. The only way in which it is possible to look at these problems is that each result would have to be a success for all of us. Otherwise, Europe will remain divided, and not just politically. It will also be divided into its developed and underdeveloped economic parts. This is precisely where Croatia and Slovenia should ask themselves where they will find a place in that division, and how much they themselves will be to blame if they remain behind the border signifying the economically underdeveloped part of Europe. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Slovene and Croatian politicians agree that good-neighborly relations require respect for the interests of both sides. To what extent is this commitment being influenced by some radical views held by a certain part of Slovenia's political public? Can they decisively interfere in the creation of far more positive relations between Slovenia and Croatia?

[Kucan] Individual radical views certainly do not contribute toward better relations. They do not contribute toward the belief that there is a will to regulate mutual relations, such mutual relations that are based on the equality of both states, on recognition of the principle of justice and mutual benefits in resolving the most sensitive and disputed issues, such as those you have already mentioned.

However, an integral part of pluralism and democracy is the peoples' right to express their views and opinions, including the most extremist and most radical ones. The question of state policies is whether to accept these as a fact or to oppose such extremist views with the arguments that a state policy must have. To base a policy on extremist views is, of course, a short-sighted thing. So is basing a state's approach to another state on extremist standpoints. The real force that can change the current strained relations between Croatia and Slovenia is certainly not in the hands of extremists. The real power in Croatia is in the hands of the legitimate bodies of government and parliament, and President Tudjman. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] As far as European integration processes are concerned, we must of course mention relations between Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia, and the Ossimo agreement. Certain political circles in Italy want the agreement to be revised. Can such demands change the EU's [European Union] basic criteria, which are vital for democracy in the EU and all other states, and can they change the EU's relations with Slovenia and Croatia.

[Kucan] Slovenia, Croatia, and the entire democratic Europe are justifiably worried by the outcome of the Italian elections. My opinion is that the outcome is an expression of the will of the people of the Republic of Italy. Therefore, this is a fact which we have to accept and respect. What will be the policy of the Italian coalition government, including the neo-fascists? This will be reflected in the government's standpoints and in its specific measures to implement them. This is the only relevant thing when making a political judgment. We base our standpoint solely on this. Any prejudged condemnation or suspicion would be a sign of immaturity in international relations. It is true that Italy has blocked Slovenia's participation in the east-west group negotiations in Warsaw. It is true that it has prevented Slovenia from being one of the nine states discussing a stability pact in Paris. I hope that it will not use its veto to prevent Slovene negotiations with the EU.

All these things require an adequate response once they have taken place, a response based on European principles, on the principles which the EU complies with, primarily on the principles of the Helsinki and the Paris declaration, which are the mainstay of the CSCE.

Our relations with Italy are formally regulated under the Ossimo treaty. Slovenia insists on being a successor to this treaty, while the Italian Parliament has recognized this. This does not mean that all our relations are regulated or that they are regulated in the best possible way. It is 10 years since these agreements were signed.

Some problems which have not been resolved by these agreements or which could be solved better, require good will, mutual trust, and, just like in relations with Croatia, justice and mutual benefits. We cannot tolerate a situation in which unresolved bilateral relations are used as blackmail, for instance as an obstacle, a condition attached to Slovenia's participation in multilateral relations. I do not believe that the EU will tolerate this, either.

As far as fascism is concerned, Slovenia is totally explicit in this respect. Some xenophobic and fascist-style phenomena in Slovenia must be met with condemnation on the part of the democratic public. The Slovene people must be aware that in World War II they were on the side of the victorious anti-fascist coalition. It is precisely today that the 50th anniversary of the invasion is being celebrated. Regrettably, Slovenia has been unjustly left out. Slovenia is not there. However, regardless of this, Slovenia's position during World War II in the anti-fascist coalition is the Slovene people's most convincing historic argument in Slovenia's international relations.

[Correspondent] As far as the area of former Yugoslavia is concerned, the question inevitably arises of resolving the Bosnia- Herzegovina crisis, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia. What is your view of the Washington agreement? In your opinion, does it mark the real beginning of the end of the war in this region?

[Kucan] First, I would like to say that everything that is going on now is a matter of redressing some initial mistakes and some initial underestimation of the gravity of the reasons behind, first the Yugoslav, and now the Balkan crisis. I believe that as yet no one has a realistic notion of how to solve this crisis as a whole, and of how to turn the Balkans, as an area of permanent instability, into an area of relative stability—relative in terms of today's stability in Europe.

Every contribution, of course, which replaces the military framework of the conflict with a diplomatic search for a solution is welcome and worthy of every effort. From this viewpoint the Washington agreement is also a precious contribution toward ending the war. On the other hand, it shows the futility and absurdity of the military conflict between the Croats and Muslims. In my view, the most damaging consequence of this conflict is the fact that it obscured the true nature of the conflict, that it obscured the identity of the aggressor and what its ambitions were in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

You see, the world is not talking about a war waged against Bosnia-Herzegovina, but about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, it is talking about a civil war, something that is a far easier issue in terms for international politics. Such a policy inflicted a great deal of damage on Croatia, in particular.

During my international meetings and talks, I have been protesting against attempts at putting an equals sign between Croatia and Serbia, and their respective motives, ambitions, and goals. I particularly protested, not very long ago, when sanctions against Croatia were being discussed. From this viewpoint, healthy relations between Croatia and Slovenia would considerably reduce this risk. Hence, the Washington agreement is a very important step, but I cannot see it as the last move in resolving the crisis.

[Correspondent] The Washington agreement mentions the possibility of setting up a confederation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and Croatia. Is a new Yugoslav integration possible in this area?

[Kucan] No. A confederation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and Croatia is possible, should both countries be interested in it, be genuinely interested in it, not giving in to the imposed interests of some other states that wish to simplify the situation and change the acute phase of the conflict into a latent one, with the possibility of this latent phase becoming an acute one again.

I cannot see any fundamental reasons or arguments for the recreation of a Yugoslav federation, confederation, or association, at least as regards Slovenia. Should it suit other countries that were created or are being created on the territory of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia will raise no objections. That is for them to decide.

Slovenia is, by its spiritual, cultural, and civilizational tradition, a central European state. It has European ambitions, as I have already mentioned. They cannot be realized in a package, or with the states of the former Yugoslavia, or with the states of the Visegrad group with which we have developed good cooperation, or with a central European group, but through gradually fulfilling conditions set forth as criteria for making a decision on whether Slovenia fulfils conditions for being admitted to the European Union. Slovenia is immensely interested in cooperating with all states, primarily with its neighbors, with states in central Europe, and also with the states of former Yugoslavia, according to the circumstances, when the war stops there, when the process of transition starts, and when they display the will for joining the European integrations.

As part of the search for solutions to the Balkan crisis, all these states need to be given the opportunity to seek prospects in Europe. Their isolation will serve to exacerbate the crisis, and will do nothing for the stability of the region.

So, the quality of relations is not to be found in the nature of the association, but is the result of objectively formulated interests and the possibility of realizing these interests on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. In other words, the nature of relations will differ considerably from relations in the former common state. They will in no way be different from the nature of Slovenia's relations with other states. This is where our prospects are, and it has nothing to do with any institutional links with the states emerging on the territory of former Yugoslavia, or whether it suits others or not. Slovenia will not oppose any attempt to set up something that is or was similar to the former Yugoslavia.

[Correspondent] According to information at our disposal, or rather, according to reports by the Slovene press, there will be no meeting with President Tudjman on the one hand, but on the other you will meet with President Tudjman [as heard]. How much would this meeting contribute toward the efforts to more speedily resolve the existing problems between Croatia and Slovenia?

[Kucan] My view is that it is not up to the presidents to tackle specific problems. They must ascertain if there is a political will in both states to resolve the problems of bilateral cooperation. It is sad that there has been no dialogue between us for almost 20 months, despite our agreement on the need for annual meetings. It is also sad that there has been no dialogue at a governmental level. This could lead to the conclusion that, in fact, there is no interest or firm strategy, or idea of what importance both Ljubljana and Zagreb attach to relations between the two states.

Responsibility for the failure to tackle issues cannot be laid squarely with one side. Each side must be made aware of its responsibilities. If this was the case, a cement mixer at the border crossing in Plovanija would not be of vital importance for determining the nature of the relations, or for resolving the problems, and for whether we

are prepared to resolve them or not. It should not depend on this whether or note I meet with President Tudjman.

In other words, under Slovenia's constitutional order, it was normal for me to ask the Foreign Ministry whether, in such circumstances, we should accept the invitation. The Foreign Ministry replied affirmatively. After that, and in view of the unilateral move inside the disputed territory—and this territory is disputed because Slovenia believes firmly that it is its own—it was necessary to get the Slovene Government's view. The Government judged the reply by Croatian Prime Minister Valentic as satisfactory, and that the construction work had been discontinued. This was a good reason for testing Zagreb's interests and willingness to cement our relations, and to intensify efforts to resolve our bilateral relations.

This is the main task of my visit. This is a working and not a protocol visit. Ahead of me are extensive talks with President Tudjman. As far as I know, he also thinks that time is not the main reason behind the talks, but a need for a profound exchange of views and arguments. I expect us to reach the common conclusion that unilateral moves are not the way toward finding solutions. Sound relations, in particular in the economic sphere, and increased cooperation provide the framework for resolving the problems much easier. However, isolated problems and insistance on tackling them alone reflect a lack of desire to resolve other problems. To what extent such views are wrong and fateful, that is something I have spoken about before.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, thank you for the interview.

Federal

Jovanovic: Bosnian Leaders Want War To Continue

AU0706163194 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Report by Vladimir Nikolic]

[Excerpts] On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Allied operation in Normandy, a celebration was held in the Central Club of the Yugoslav Army. Vladimir Nikolic reports.

[Begin recording] [Nikolic] The festivities were attended by Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic, Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, members of the federal, republican, and city councils of the Federation of Associations of Veterans of the People's Liberation War [SUBNOR], and the military attaches of the British, French, and Russian Embassies in Belgrade. Although he was invited, the military representative of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade failed to show up. [passage omitted]

After the gathering ended, we asked Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic to assess this year's celebration of the Allied operation.

[Jovanovic] According to my feelings for history, this should have been the place to reaffirm—in a very graphic and demonstrative way—the unity in the struggle against fascism and all forces that participated in the struggle against fascism should have been here. That is why the back door invitation, so to speak, (?extended) to the SUBNOR representatives is not how the Yugoslav victims—fighters against fascism—deserve to be treated by the allies of yesterday, who have now become our opponents. On the other hand, not inviting Russia as the successor of the former Soviet Union is not very convincing.

[Nikolic] We also asked Minister Jovanovic to comment on the progress of the Geneva negotiations so far.

[Jovanovic] Everything is clear, everything is on the table. What we have been saying for a year, if not longer, has finally come to light. The Muslim side in Bosnia—or more precisely, its fundamentalist leadership—simply does not want the end of the war or peace. It wants war, or the peace that it would achieve through war. This means they are insisting on a unitary Bosnia and the full domination of the Croatian-Muslim element over the Serbs in Bosnia. [end recording]

Lilic: FRY 'Punished' for Choosing Peace

AU0706172994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Report by Miroslav Pisarevic]

[Excerpts] The 12th Congress of the Association of Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia has begun in Novi Sad. The motto of the congress is work, income, and social security. In addition to 200 delegates and some 50 domestic and foreign guests, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Zoran Lilic also participated in the morning session. Miroslav Pisarevic reports:

[Begin recording] [Pisarevic] The congress began with the strains of The International and was opened by Grozdana Miljanovic, president of the 2-million-member organization. She stressed that the federal trade union had—in the period between two congresses—focused on the needs of the working masses and their families. The trade union has supported the program of the country's economic revival, said Miljanovic. [passage omitted]

The congress was also addressed by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Zoran Lilic. He stressed that the congress is taking place at a time when our country is exposed to strong pressure, blackmail from abroad, and the economic blockade.

[Lilic] We have been punished by a complete blockade and an attempt at absolute international isolation because we have chosen negotiations as a way out of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, because we have chosen a political solution and peace, rather than the way of terror and violence. A way which, unfortunately, has in many ways been paved by the international community itself, with its diffidence and inclination toward the extortionist demands of the Muslim fundamentalists. The unjustified and inhuman sanctions—which, alas, we must always mention, and this gathering here today is no exception—such as have never been implemented against a single country in the international community, have been imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia based on false accusations. Today, many former politicians that directly participated in the breaking up of Yugoslavia openly admit this and justify it by saying that it was carried out under pressure and without an objective assessment of the realistic situation in the former Yugoslavia.

[Pisarevic] The economic situation in the country was particularly difficult toward the end of last year. However, we soon successfully started implementing the new economic program, President Lilic said, and added.

[Lilic] I would venture to say that the program, which was already discussed here a short while ago, is proof of our strength, our perseverance, and our vitality. A growing number of countries throughout the world are showing interest in the Yugoslav program and the results that have been achieved so far. The people that imposed the sanctions expected a breakdown of the political, economic, cultural, scientific, and all other life in Yugoslavia. To put it succinctly, they expected complete capitulation. Instead, something unprecedented in economic theory has happened. In place of the desired chaos, we have attained a firm dinar, eliminated the

hyperinflation, pared the money emission down to realistic [word indistinct], and stabilized the prices and the realistic exchange rate of the dinar. The Yugoslav dinar on the world exchanges—and I especially want to stress this here today—is a language that the Western world, particularly the Western business community on which the world rests, understands very well.

[Pisarevic] We are glad that we can defend the sovereignty and integrity of Yugoslavia with a strong dinar, stressed Lilic, and added.

[Lilic] The most important thing for our economic and every other form of prosperity is to turn our attention to work and knowledge and first search here for solutions to our problems. That is why the implementation of the program is our collective work and mutual responsibility. More order and more work in our economy, in these complex circumstances, and the mobilization of all forces for reviving the economy, as stipulated by the program [sentence as heard]. It is only through our work and knowledge, and the rational and effective use of our own potential, that we can attain the position that is rightfully ours among the countries of the world. The basic thing is to believe in ourselves, to know what we want, and to have the strength to actually achieve it. [end recording]

Karadzic, Milosevic Vying for Serbian Leadership

AU0706194894 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jun 94 pp 12, 13

[Report by Cvijetin Milivojevic: "Is Karadzic Milosevic's Rival?"]

[Text] If it is the political elimination of Slobodan Milosevic to which Bill Clinton referred while speaking about necessary changes in Serbia, the Serbian opposition should really be concerned about its chances to win in the possible early elections. So-called well-informed circles have connected the attitude of the U.S. President with the alleged statement by a high official of the government in Pale, who, according to the same source, said that it would best if Milosevic withdrew and gave up the function to a politician like, for instance, Zoran Djindjic or Vojislav Kostunica.

With these speculations about possible "castling" in the leadership of the greatest of all Serbian states the proposal made by the cochairman of the London conference on former Yugoslavia, namely Lord David Owen, could easily fit in as well, since he asked [former FRY President] Dobrica Cosic in a way to return to public (political) life, for that would give an impetus to the peace process.

Until now, the Serbian opposition has, as a rule, clung to any unfavorable remark by the West addressed to the current president, seeking in it indirect support of the great world powers for its own political attitudes. This time, however, the greatest part of the opposition has passed over in silence Clinton's position on lifting the international blockade against the FRY. Moreover, the chairman of the Democratic Party has demanded from the ruling parties in Serbia and Montenegro that the key positions in the federal state be occupied by the most powerful among the Montenegrin and Serbian socialists, which also suggests Milosevic's moving in the Palace of Federation.

However, even more indicative is the statement made by Radovan Karadzic, whom the nationalistic part of the Serbian and Montenegrin opposition considers to be Milosevic's only serious rival in some imaginary all-Serbian elections. Last weekend the leader of the Bosnian Serbs diplomatically said that nobody would deny any opportunity to Milosevic even to formally become the leader of all Serbian states. The chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of the Serbian states is obviously realistic in estimating his own chances in a political match against Milosevic, but the very fact that the state-run television ignored Karadzic's performances in Subotica and Novi Sad speaks enough for how bothersome a riddle Karadzic is for the Serbian socialists.

Undoubtedly, Karadzic's efforts are aimed at long term effects. In the international public he is presenting himself as a peacemaker, imitating Milosevic's turn toward peace, and just like the president of Serbia, whenever he negotiates a strategic withdrawal or unpopular surrender of territories in Bosnia, he pushes his aides in the focus of attention.

On the inter-Serbian plane the president of the republic of Srpska mobilizes the nationalistic opposition bloc that, under the deceitful disguise of the SDS, is spreading more and more, annihilating the monopoly of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]. The socialists have also felt this danger, and therefore they are announcing the foundation of the SPS of all the Serbian states, which could take place as early as on the holiday of Vidovdan [28 June]. Karadzic's party platform (SDS as a tranquilizing and stabilizing force whose only ideology is the welfare of the Serbian people and all those who remain to live in the Serbian states) appears attractive, all the more since for the most part it is Djindjic's and Kostunica's democrats, Serbian populists, and even Seselj's Radicals who are standing behind Karadzic. Besides, Milosevic's currently strongest rival is more popular among the church representatives and other national institutions as well.

This trench warfare, garnished with exchanges of smiles and also with the obvious lack of emotions despite benevolent, "too strong words" on the part of Karadzic, will probably last until a political settlement for Bosnia is signed. No doubt that as soon as that happens Milosevic will be offered by many sides what for the time being is openly proposed only by Djindjic, but it is also certain that some charismatic prime minister of a unified Serbian state (the first candidate would precisely be Karadzic) would be constantly undermining the position of the president of such a state.

Now it is Milosevic's turn to act, and he will probably weigh up until the last moment whether it is better for him to make a start in the possible all-Serbian state from the position of the indisputable president of Serbia, or from a less secure position of the head of the FRY. Therefore, the changes in Serbia mentioned by Clinton may refer in the first place to a possible revision of competences of the federation and those of the republics. According to the criteria of the majority of Serbs, Milosevic has done his job. Now it is executive bodies, cartographers, and even less soldiers who are on the move, and when speaking of giving up certain territories in Bosnia, for instance, Milosevic cannot exert any decisive influence on the matter any more, even if he would genuinely want to. And such a half-ceremonial position in the current situation perfectly suits Milosevic the politician, just as a break.

Kosovo

Parties Deny 'Secret' Talks With Serbs

AU0706213694 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] [Announcer] Albanian political parties and other institutions in the republic of Kosova continue to react against fabrications regarding Albanian-Serb secret talks in Belgrade and against the individuals who are promoting such fabrications. Here is a report by Ramadan Mucolli from Prishtina:

[Mucolli] All the reactions of political parties and other Albanian bodies in Kosova against the Serb fabrications on the alleged secret talks between the Albanian and Serbian sides stress that only the legitimate Kosova representatives, freely elected by the people, have the mandate to hold such talks on the question of Kosova.

It is reported that a meeting of the Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK] Branch Presidency in Gjakove stressed that the membership of this party in this commune is aware of the fact that only those who have the mandate of the people can talk about Kosova's political status.

On this occasion, they stressed that the position of the LDK and other Albanian political subjects on the solution of the Kosova question rely on the political will of the people expressed through a referendum and that the dialogue with Belgrade can be developed only on this basis and with the participation of international organizations.

The Kosova Liberal Party has also turned down offers by several Serb politicians for some individuals to participate in talks between Kosova and Serbia.

A public statement issued by this party states that Serbia is attempting to concoct a Serb-Albanian dialogue characteristic of the communist regime and of a modified and perfidious methodology. This party stresses that, by attempting to profess to the world that it allegedly supports dialogue with the Albanians, Serbia wants to select only the Albanians with whom it can find a common language to continue the slavery of the Albanian people in Kosova, but also to disqualify the legitimate representatives of the Kosova people elected in the free elections of 24 May 1992.

Regarding a solution on the question of Kosova, the Union of the Independent Trade Unions of Kosova has stated that it recognizes and supports only the legitimate representatives of the Kosovar people, who have the mandate to fulfill the determination of the people for Kosova as an independent and sovereign state.

In a conversation with a Dutch delegation, Dr. Hajrullah Gorani, chairman of these trade unions, stressed that the talks of individuals who represent no one are not serious and cannot solve any problem and, as such, they do not have the support of the people or the trade unions.

Branches and sub-branches of political parties and other Albanian associations in Kosova have also reacted to the Serb fabrications on these so-called secret talks.

Democratic Alliance Holds News Conference

AU0806095094 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 28 May 94 p 3

[Report by Shefqet Rexhepi on news conference held by Rexhep Gjergji and Fatmir Sejdiu, members of the presidium of the Kosova Democratic Alliance, in Pristina on 27 May: "Encouraging Signs for the Albanian Political Movement in Kosova"]

[Text] President Rugova is successfully continuing his visit to several West European countries. After his visit to Denmark, he is now in Norway. His high-level reception and the understanding shown for the Albanians' demands are encouraging signs for the Albanian political movement in Kosova. On the first day of his visits president Rugova met the speaker of the Norwegian parliament, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the parliamentary groups, and representatives of charities, who gave their full support to the peaceful policies of the Albanians and promised Norway's full commitment to helping to settle the question of Kosova in accordance with the Albanians' demands. With these comments, Dr. Rexhep Gjergji, member of the presidium of the Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK], opened yesterday's news conference in Prishtina.

Voices That Initially Discounted the Elections

Rexhep Gjergji went on to stress that the recent meeting of President Berisha and Gligorov in Poeradec was conducted as part of a commuted Albanian policy to settle through democratic means all the outstanding problems of the region, especially those of the Albanians in Macedonia. Gjergji then hailed the start of the daily publication of the newspaper FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT and the initiative to increase the amount of Albanian-language broadcasting on Macedonia Radio-Television, to expand the secondary school system, and

to open a teacher-training college. Achieving state-forming status for the Albanians in Maoedonia means full equality with other citizens of this republic. Only in this way will Macedonia be stable and a factor of peace in the region.

Talking about the elections of 24 May 1992, Rexhep Gjergji said that in these first multiparty elections the electorate gave their votes for their own deputies and president. These elections were and will remain historic for the nation, for democracy, and for the Republic of Kosova. Serbian military and police forces have impeded the Constitution and operation of the parliament. Nevertheless, the elections have lost nothing of their importance. They gave legitimacy to the representatives of Kosova and of the Albanians and showed who has the right to decide and to speak on behalf of the people of Kosova. We consider the demands for the parliament to be constituted for the most part reasonable, as demands to further the formation of our institutions. However, there are also occasional voices that discount the elections. The parliament of the Republic of Kosova will be constituted at the most favorable opportunity and will operate freely, and nobody can decide anything about Kosova before this is done.

Weapons Campaign

During last week too, the weapons campaign was widespread in the communes of Prishtina, Podujeve, Vushtrri [Vucitrn], Skendera, [Srbica], Han i Elezit [Djeneral Jankovic], Gllogovo, Malisheve, Suhareke [Suva Reka], Ferizaj [Urosevac], Lipjan, Viti, Kline, etc. There were acts of barbarism on the part of the Serbian police, citizens were brutally beaten, and there were acts of destruction and vandalism. The Serbian police also entered the Kosova Chamber of Commerce and arrested everyone who was present, including its chairman Ismail Kastrati and secretary Sulejman Ahmeta. The chairman and secretory are still being held under arrest. There were also police interventions in schools, while the most provocative incident was the blockade of Prishtina market on the eve of Kurban sajram [Muslim festival, on whose eve believers buy sacrificial lambs]. Thus the Serbian regime demonstrated its vicious restrictions on religious freedoms. The weapons collection campaign and the forced recruitments of young Albanian men in the Serbian Army have been accompanied by the plunder of large sums of money from Albanians. There is plenty of evidence that can be published about these incidents.

Rexhep Gjergji and Fatmir Sejdiu, members of the LDK Presidium, went on to reply to journalists' questions. Asked what would be the keynote of Dr. Rugova's speech to the UN General Assembly, Fatmir Sejdiu said that Rugova's positions are familiar, and they will be placed before this important assembly. He will set forth his own standpoints, which are at the same time those of the people.

Vacillations of the International Community

In reply to a question, Rexhep Gjergji said that FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT had made an important contribution toward affirming the demands of the Albanians, especially in raising their status to a constituent element in the state. Meanwhile, commenting on President Clinton's statement about "tightening the measures against Serbia and Montenegro," he said that this was in accordance with our stand that the easing or removal of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro must be conditional on quenching the hotbeds of crisis in the former Yugoslavia, of course including the problem of Kosova. The demands of the congressmen too, Rexhep Gjergji went on, approximate to our stands, and it is probable that an ever-increasing number of congressmen will support our cause.

Rexhep Gjergji added that the main factor causing these crises and horrors in Europe is Milosevic and his gunmen. However, the international community has vacillated in its attitude toward him, and some of its measures have even emboldened him.

'Trumped-Up' Trial of 13 Albanians To Resume

AU0706183194 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] The trumped-up trial of the 13 Albanians who were charged with impersonating leaders of the Defense Ministry [words indistinct] of Kosova will resume on 20 June. The trial began on 18 April but was postponed because of complaints by the attorneys, who are demanding that the prosecutor and deputy prosecutor of the Serb Prosecution Office for the Prishtina region be removed from the trial.

The attorneys have confirmed that the trial will continue, even though a request for defense has not been approved. The attorneys of the accused have denied the charges and consider the trial to be a politically trumped-up one against the Albanians in Kosova.

h Threatening Serbia

LD0706194994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1307 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Excerpt] Pristina, 7 Jun (TANJUG)—The District Public Prosecutor's Office in Pristina today charged seven Kosovo Albanians with the criminal act of threatening the territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Charges were filed against Fehmija Ljestrani, Skeljzen Bajrami, Ljuan Heta, Nedzmedin Sadriju, Becir Muljeci, Isni Franc, and Bajram Galapani. According to the indictment, during the second half of 1992 and last year, while in the Republic of Albania, the group "in cooperation with other persons, plotted and carried out actions aimed at helping the secession of Kosovo and Metohija, and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia populated with members of the Albanian minority with

the ultimate aim of setting up a separate state, and its integration with neighboring Albania." [passage omitted]

Police Torture During Arms Collection Alleged

AU0806101494 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 28 May 94 p 11

[Report by C. Ibishi: "A Nightmare Life From Tortures"]

[Text] Anybody who sets off on the road to a village in Shala wonders in terror how he will pass the police checkpoints at Tunel i Pare and Stanterg. That is where the maltreatment begins, concluding with savage tortures in the Serbian police stations. Many buses are stopped at these sensitive points, and their passengers checked. Cars are also inspected, and the most eagerly expected are those with license plates from other towns.

All this is done on the pretext of searching for weapons and to create tension. During these checks, according to the mood of the police, travelers are beaten and then sent to the police station, where the police continue their "urgent" mission with beatings and manhandling of the harshest and most inhuman kind. Teachers also pass these checkpoints, and are taken in for questioning and asked where they are going and why.

Houses Raided, Men Tortured in Police Stations

Raids on houses in the Shala region have recently intensified. Not a day has passed since the new year without a house being searched, supposedly for weapons or young people who have not been sent on military service. Heads of families are beaten in front of members of their family, and grown-up sons are tortured. The police go wild if they do not find weapons. They are not content with rubber truncheons, fists, kicks, and punches; there have been cases of men tied behind tractors and beaten on the back with spades. In some cases, teeth and ribs have been broken, and some people are still bedridden as a result of injuries caused by the police. Such beatings have occurred in Stanterg, Bare, Bajgore, Vidishiq, Rashan, Zabergje, Majjere, and recently in Vllahi and other villages.

Many men have been issued with summons to appear at the police station. Stanterg has for many months been a scene of torture, where the inhabitants of Shala wait in line to be taken in for questioning. If they do not hand in weapons, they are beaten and tortured by policemen now notorious for their barbaric lack of restraint. If the police wear themselves out beating Albanians, those waiting outside have to come back the next day to be subjected to police tortures. It has been common for dozens of village houses to be raided on the same day, with dozens of men and boys being taken to police stations to be beaten and tortured without scruple. The Serbian regime wants to sow fear in this region so that the population will move, with the younger generation setting off for the big wide world.

Heads of Households Beaten and Manhandled

Police violence and torture take place not only in the villages of Mitrovice, but in those of Leposaviq and Vushtrri [Vucitrn]. The Albanians are mainly beaten over weapons. Old men say that these tortures are worse than those of 1956, because then only the heads of households were beaten, whereas now any male the police come across may be beaten at home in the presence of the rest of the family. Even women can be beaten, as in cases in Bistrice, Stanterg, Sllatine near Vushtrri, etc. This filthy campaign is being led by a certain Velovic, Kandic, and one Vucina from Vushtrri, who at one time pretended to be the Albanians' friends. Velovic has forgotten how he used to talk 10 years ago in front of delegations that came to Trepca, saying, "It is a pleasure to see Serbs, Albanians, Dalmatian Croats, Montenegrins, Romany Gypsies, and Latins living together at Tunel and Stanterg, helping each other....

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